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Abstract
Charles Taylor in his essay"The Opening Arguments ofThe Phenomenology" argues
that the first three chapters ofHegel's Pbeoomrno!ogy o[Spjrit are an essay in transcendental
argument. This suggests that Hegelian phenomenology is principally concerned with
eSLablishing what the transcendental preconditions of human knowledge and action are. In
this thesis I will argue that Hegel's work should be seen as an anempt 10 move beyond an
idealism thai simply appeals to subjective reason, and thus the opening chapters of the
"Phenomenology" should not be construed as a transcendental argument.
Hegel is often critical of transcendental method. and of modem epistemology
generally, precisely because it views knowledge as primarily a dimension of human self-
consciousness. It is Hegel's view that Kantian epistemology, for example. is flawed in thai
it is a procedure that assumes an original distinction between our consciousness and the
world. which once assumed can never be bridged. And while Hegel recognizes that
knowledge in some manner involves self-conscious reason, he calls for a reversal of lite
modem predilection to ground it solely within such a reason.
Accordingly. in Chapter One I examine Hegel's concept of phenomenology and his
criticism of subjective idealism; in Chapter Two, in the light of this criticism. I address
Taylor's view of transcendental argument, and his claim that phenomenological argument
is similar in structure; and finally, in Chapter Three, the specific issue ofwhether the opening
movemenl of the Phenomeno!ogy o[ Spirit is transcendental in form is dealt with.
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Chapter One
Hegel's Concept of Phenomenology
In his article "The Opening Arguments of The Phenomenology~Charles Taylor
maintains thai first three chapters of Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpiril can be read as an essay
in lronSCcndental argument. Specifically. it can be rend as a transcendental argument oCthe
Kantian form. But given Hegel's frequent criticisms of Kant's philosophical melhod. is this
an appropriate formulation of Hegel's work? In his lectures on the I ecnm:s on the Histop'
~. for example. Hegel criticises Kant's philosophy lor being merely subjective.
Kantian philosophy he states:
... leads knowledge into consciousness and self-consciousness.
but from this standpoinl maimains it 10 be a subjective and
finile knowledge. Thus although it deals with the infinite Idea.
expressing its fonnal categories and arriving al its concrete
claims. it yet again denies Ihis 10 be the trulh. making il a
simple subjective. because it has once for all accepted finite
knowledge as the fixed and ultimate standpoint I
In the I ovic' The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, as well, Hegel makes a
similar criticism of the Kantian standpoint:
'Thoughts. according 10 Kant, although lUliversal and
necessary categories, are only our thoughts· separated by an
impassable gulf from the thing. as it exists apart from our
knowledge.:
But Hegel immedialely responds that:
... the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts. far
from being merely ours. must at the same time be the real
essence oCthe things. and of whatever is an object to us.}
It is clear from much of Hegel's commentary on Kant's work that he rejects the
dualism between the thing as it exists ftfor consciousness" and as it exists "apart from our
knowkdge". Taylor commends Hegel for opposing epistemological and ontological dualism.
yet he thinks that Hegel is using transcendental argument. which. as we shall see. Hegel
contends arises out ofa dualistic view of knowledge and being. Is it lX>SSible. then.. to oppose
dualism. as Hegel does. and employ transcendental argument as Taylor insists that Hegel is
doing?
The lOCus of the present chapter. accordingly. will be an examination of Hegel's
account of his own method and how he views it as differing from ttaditional epistemological.
FonunateJy. most of what Hegel has to say on the subject of phenomenology is outlined in
th~ "Pr~fac~" and "Introduction" to the PheonrnenQloRY pf Spirit. although it is in the
"Introduction". specitically. that Hegel outlines in detail his method of carrying out
phenomenological inquiry.
(n the "Introduction" Hegel straightaway poses the question which epistemology sets
lor itself. Can our knowing afford us genuine access to the world or is it in some way
defective? The agenda for any epistemological inquiry involves detennining the limits of our
knowledge. in order to establish the validity ofour knowing. Hegel fiames the maner in the
lollowing .....ay:
It is a natural assumption that in philosophy. before we start
to deal with its proper subject maner...one must first of all
come to an understanding about cognition...because cognition
is a faculty of a definite kind and scope. and thus. without a
more precise definition of its nature and limits. we might
grasp clouds oferror instead of tile heaven oftruth.~
In other .....ords. if it is assumed that our knowing is some kind of instrument for getting hold
of the truth. then there is the added implication that we need to insure that the instrument is
not defective. The need to avoid error. therefore. impels the epistemologist to try to
determine exactly what the subject contributes to the act of knowing. In this manner. it is
thought. any prejudice that might be inherent in our faculty of knowing can be eliminated.
thus leaving us with the object as it really is.
Hegel has serious misgivings with this approach because it assumes that we can set
down. in advance. the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Additionally. in Hegel's
opinion. it assumes that knowing is some kind ofinstrument by means of which we get hold
of the truth. or a passive medium through which the truth reaches us. In both instances
cognition can only grasp its object as in some way modified. either by the refraction of the
medium or by the reshaping power of the instrument. Of the latter process Hegel assens:
... if cognition is the instrument for gening hold of absolute
being. it is obvious that the use of an instrument on a thing
certainly does not let it be what it is for itself. but rather sets
out to reshape and alter iI.'
Thus. ifcognition is viewed as some kind of instrument which alters and reshapes its object.
then it must be different from that which it knows. We have cognition. in whatever form it
may lake. on the one side. and the object as it is in itself on the other.
[n both instances. though. a critical inquiry into the nature and limits ofknowledge
will not resolve the problem. If, for instance, the inquiry attempts to acquaint itself with the
workings of the instrument of cognition, in order that it might eliminate the shaping
functions of the instrument it merely leaves its object exactly what it was before this inquiry.
[f. on the other hand. the investigation anempts to remove the refracting capacity of the
instrument. this will not solve our problem either, because the elimination of me ray will also
involve the elimination ofthe means whereby the truth reaches us. If the ray were eliminated.
explains Hegel•
...all that would be indicated would be a pure dir.:ction or a
blank space.6
This is to say. if cognition is viewed as a medium through which we gel hold oran object.
then its removal also entails the removal of access to the object. • Le. there would be no
object of thought lor us.
But. as mentioned previously. what is also of concern 10 Hegel here is the question
of whether it is possible to set down. in advance. what knowledge itself is. In the~
~ Hegel states of critical philosophy and its aims:
And a funher claim is made when it is said that we must
know the faculty of knowledge before we can know. For 10
investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them;
but how we are to know without knowing. how we are to
apprehend the truth before the truth, it is impossible to say.7
Knowledge or science cannot be merely an arbitrary affair. but if we set down. in advance.
what knowledge is or is not. we prejudice everything we know. That is to say. we delennine
in a prior procedure that knowledge. to be valid, must be of a definite kind and scope. and
if it is not then it is illusion.. myth. error, ele., but nol genuine knowledge. And while Hegel
does not direclly mention them in the Phenomenology Of Spidt, there are, plainly, other
methodological difficulties in any epistemological enterpdse, ones which Hegel must be
cognizant of in h.is own inquiry. For instance, now is it possible, ifat all, to get outside ofour
cognitive life in order to make a critical examination of it? If we are able to do this, then
what is the status of this knowledge of knowledge? Moreover. if it is also some kind of
knowledge. is it not, then, itself subject 10 the same conditions which it establishes in its
preliminary inquiry? All orthis would seem 10 suggest that epistemological inquiries by their
very nature arc caught in a circle or dilemma. As Hegel remarks in "Introduction" to the
~; "To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it".' In other
words. every epistemological inquiry, ifit is making a claim about the nature and validity of
knowledge in general. either has to appeal to its own criterion, whict\ would make it a
circular argument. or it has to make some preliminary presuppositions about knowledge. In
either case we have an epistemological predicament. Whether it is possible to reconcile this
view of Hegel's with Taylor's contention that Hegel's argument in the pbcnomcDQlogy Qf
s.airi.t will only hold ifcertain presuppositions about knowledge are made, is a question that
will have to be addressed when assessing Taylor's thesis.
It is difficult to see how traditional epistemology can avoid these problems. Even, for
example. if the preliminary presuppositions that it made were considered to be provisional
ones Qnly. putatively unproblematic as Charles Taylor contends. this is a questionable
procedure. Epistemology by its very nature is directed at the entire corpus of human
knowledge and so the initial starting point, Qn the face of it., cannot be exempt from its
investigation. To put this differently. there is no fixed. independent starting point. be it a
detached ego - the "I think"- or some "originaJ ground". from which the a priori conditions
of knowledge can be detennined. As we shall see later. for Hegel. science or knowledge is
not merely knowledge of reason or experience as such - i.e. the a priori conditions of all
~xperience and action. but knowledge as it is revealed in human affairs and history.
In addition to these particular-concerns with the methodology employed by traditional
epistemology. Hegel is also convinced that this view of cognition as either a mediwn or
instrument. and the concomitant preoccupation with "falling into error" gives rise to another
difficulty. Specifically.
... it presupposes that cognition which. since it is excluded
from the Absolute. is surely outside of the truth as well. is
nevertheless true. an assumption whereby what calls itself
fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the tnIth.~
In other words. the instrumental view ofcognition generates two kinds oftnlths. what is true
'lor us' and what is true 'in itselr. Thus it is a view of knowing which rests on the same
subject·object distinction to which we previously referred. a distinction between our
thinking. and reality as something other. about which we think.
Hegel's complaint here is that once this distinction is assumed it becomes
unbridgeable. Why? Because any preliminary epistemological inquiry which attempts to
remove the shaping influences ofoW' cognition will only lead us back to the initial. spurious
division between our knowing and the absolute. As he explains:
If we remove from a reshaped thing what the instrument has
done to it. then the thing. here the Absolute· becomes for us
exactly what it was before this [accordingly} superfluous
efforl. IO
To distinguish betv.'een two kinds of knowing. one absolute and one finite. as
Schelling does. does not solve the problem either. because in the Schellingian system. finite
knowledge only appears to be real at the finite standpoint, but is ultimately absorbed into the
oneness of the absolute standpoint. Thus Hegel's gibe at Schelling:
Dealing with something from the perspective of the absolute
consists merely in declaring that. although one has been
speaking of it just now as something definite. yet in the
Absolute. A=A. there is nothing of the kind. for there all is
one. To pit this single insight, that in the Absolute everything
is the same. against the full body of articulated cognition.
which at least seeks and demands such fulfilment. to palm off
its absolute as the night in which. as the saying goes. all cows
are black· this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity.11
That is to say. if all tinite standpoints of knowledge are merely absorbed in some absolute
standpoint. then they arc in a sense annulled, Knowledge when reduced to an abstract
principl~ of identity (A=A). says nothing at all. is vacuous. In other words. if all knowledge
is reduced to the principle of identity. all the featw'es and nuances ofactual hwnan life either
get absorbed or are ignored.
These objections mayor may not be valid. but they are genuine concerns for Hegel's
0"'011 project in the Phenomenology QfSnirit. We need to make a beginning in philosophy.
but there does not seem. on the face of it, any grounds for doing so. Kantian epistemology
is ruled out because it preswoes just what it seeks to establish., i.e. knowledge. Hegel makes
the following observation on Kant's critical philosophy:
...since the investigation of tile facultiesofknowkdge is itself
kno\lo;ng, il cannot in Kant anain to what it aims at because it
is that already. il cannot CO~ to itself~ il is already
withitself...'J
Furthermore since the various distinctions such as subj«tive-objective. cognition-truth. etc.•
which are often employed in investigations or inquiries into what knowing is and what it is
not. are lerms whose meanings are not yet established. 1beir meaning. in Hegel's estimation.
"... is assumed to be genernlly familiar..." when ind«d they could be even regarded as
deccptive. 'J That is to suggest that there is something dogmatic about accepting these tenns
as well known. when their meaning as not been justified except by the conviction of the
philosopher himself. Thus. for Hegel. at the begiMing of any inquiry inlo the nature: of
knowing.. no justification as been given for their use. As Hegel is also aware. he cannot
appeal 10 some C,'(lemal crilerionofknowledge because that too would require ajustifieation.
and so on aJ infinitum. As he observes in the ·lntroduclion~ [0 the~;
Philosophy misses an advanUlgC enjoyed by the other
sciences. 11 cannol like them rest the existence of its objeas
on the natulal admissions ofconsciousness. nor can it asswne
that its ~thod of cognition, either for SWting of for
continuing. is one already accepled. '4
One might ask Taylor how such a claim can be reconciled with his own claim that
transcendental argument appeals to two supposedly self.evident and basic facets of
experience. the "I think" and the .polarization between subject and object? Taylor. for
example. asserts that the first claim of any transcendental argument is self.evident or
something wejust~. He stales:
We just see Ihat experience must be of something to be
experience, or that the "1 think" must be able to accompany
all my represenlations. I '
If Hegel is arguing that our own subj~tivity. or. as he states, the ""natural admissions of
consciousness", is not Ihe essential feature in knowing, it is questionable whether his work
is transcendental in fonn as Taylor suggests. But some alternative interpretation of Hegel's
work is called for.
What kind of solution. then, is available to solve the predicament that epistemology
has wrought? Can Hegel return, in the manner of Kant. as Taylor insists he does. to inquire
again into the nature of knowledge? Our preliminary investigation would suggest that he
cannot. given his conviction that such an enterprise is destine to fail, because it presumesjust
what it endeavours to overcome. namely the separation between the inquirer and the object
of his or her inquiry. Additionally. any kind of preliminary inquiry into the nature and scope
of knowledge is itselfan act of knowledge. This. in Hegel's view. is a fallacious procedure.
as his observation of the critical method of philosophy indicates.
In the case ofother instruments. we can try and criticize them
in other ways than by setting about the special work for which.
they are destined. But the examination afknowledge can only
be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-
called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek
to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of
Scholasticus. not to venture into the water until he had
learned to swim. 16
Science. philosophy. does not need to start with some antecedent inquiry into the faculty of
cognition. Again. Hegel states:
10
It may seem as if philosophy, in order to start on its course,
had. like the rest of the sciences. to begin with a subjective
presupposition..Jt is by the free act ofthought that it occupies
a point of view, in which it is for its own self. and thus gives
itself an object of its own production. 11
Another way of viewing this is to recognize that there are not two kinds of knowledge but
~. whose justification is not established by some antecedent investigation. employing
preconceived criteria or notions ofe"perience. This is lo suggest that what knowledge is is
not determined by some antecedent investigation. but the result of the very activity of
consciousness living through one context ofobjectivity after another until the standpoint of
actual knowledge is reached. Knowing. accordingly. educates ilselfas to its own legitimate
foundations. nOI by employing Cl(temal standards but from its own sell<ritica1 development.
But Hegel realizes that science in its initial appearance alongside ofother modes of
knowledge is not yet science in its developed and unfolded truth. and needs. therefore. to
establish its credentials. II He knows., as he states in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology
~. that just because science comes on the scene. it cannot merely assure us that it is
a ditTerent sort ofknowing and let the maner stand. Nor. $ he further recognizes. can science
simply reject ordinary ways of looking at things as untrue or inadequate. As Hegel himself
indicates: "one bare assurance is wonh just as much as another".19 Moreover. if science were
advanced in this way. its standpoint wouJd be understood $ outside of or external to the
prevailing views of what knowing is and would be in essence suggesting that they are untrue
or wrong. It would also be insinuating that the various stages of flnite, or phenomenal
knowing. do not constitute the road or pathway to science. The effect of this would be
II
introduce a dualism becween ordinary, finite knowledge and science. Bul. as we know. Hegel
wants to argue that finite or ordinary knowing is a moment of actual knowledge. Emil L
Facklmheim rightly points out that for Hegel:
There can be no total and unbridgeable dualism between a
self·examination occurring in nonphilosophic life, and a
pllilosophic thought in exclusive possession of all criteria for
recognition both the fact and meaning of this self-
examination. If there were such a dualism. now could any
individuaLascend the ladder to the absolute standpoint.
handed him by a philosopher who himself is already· quite
inexplicably· al that standpoint? 20
Additionally. if there were such a dualism. we would have the situation where there is two
kinds of knowledge. one. the empirical knowledge of the everyday life and the "'Iorking
scientist. and second. the knowledge of knowledge. epistemological knowledge. wnicn
establisnes tne requirements and limits of the fonner.
If there is no dualism between science and. as Emil L. Fackenheim states. Ute "self-
examination occurring in nonph.ilosopnic life", what is me nature of Hegel's distinction,
then. berween phenomenal or finite knowing and absolute knowing or science? The difficulty
here is that Hegel never gives us a concise definition of what phenomenal knowing is. It is
not. obviously. strictly historical for it would be difficult to see how its development could
be understood as necessary and ultimately completed as absolule knowing. One way of
understanding what Hegel means by phenomenal knowing is to see it in relationsnip 10
Kant's notion of knowing presented in the Critique of Pun: BraSlln. For Kan[ all knowledge
is knowledge of phenomena (sense data). That is 10 say. human knowledge is limited to the
12
given phenomena ofsensible: intuition. which for Kant ate inevitably objectified lhroug,h the
concepts supplied by the understanding. Thus there is 00 knowledge of -things in
themseh'es-. but only of things as they are "ror us·. 1bere is no absolute knowledge. only
finite knowledge; no knowledge as it arises from the nature of things. but only knowledge
as it is constituted by the demands of our own subjectiviry.
Hegel does nol disagree with Kant on the issue of whether phenomenal knowledge
is finite or not. Nor does he disagree with Kant's claim that human knowledge is of
appearances. He states:
The things immediately known are mere appearances - in
other words. the ground oftheir being is not in themselves but
in something else. But then comes the imponant step of
defining what this something else is. According to Kant.. the
things that we know about are 10 us appearanccsonly. and y,-e
can never know their essential nature. which belongs to
another world we cannot approacb.!l
But Hegel counters wilh a different view ofttle matter.
For the true statement of the case is rather as follows. The
things of which we have direct consciousness are mere
phenomma.. not for us only, but in their own nature: and the
true and proprr case of these things. fmite as they are. is to
have their existence founded not in themselves but in the
universal divine Idea.~
In the maner of knowledge. similarly. "finite" knowledge is an appearance or a moment in
actual or absolute knowledge. not as with Kant mere appearance or knowledge of
phenomena. Each configuration of consciousness, therefore. must be the absolute
manifesting itselfin a particular fonn. Thus the ttal question for Hegel is not the relationship
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between the knowing subject and what is known. but the relation ofknowledge itselfto its
appearances· i.e. phenomenal ronns. But the distinction between phenomenal knowledge
and absolute knowledge still needs to be explained. The concise explanation is thai
phenomenal knowledge is a knowing which is burdened with a division between the knower
and what is known - i.e. between what is "for us" and what is 'in itself', whereas in absolute
knowing all such divisions are set aside. In "sense-cenainty", for example. consciousness
lakes its object to be a sense particular. but discovers that the object as thus understood docs
not completely confonn to this concept orit. In "sense-eertainty", then. as with all ronns of
phenomenal knowing. there is a discrepancy between the concept which animates that form
of knowing and its objective reality.
But science cannot come about. as nOled previously, by inquiring once again into the
nature of knowledge in the Kantian fashion. What is required instead is an examination by
consciousness of itself. For this reason a "phenomenological" exposition is required.
Phenomenological exposition is a recapitulation or presentation of the development of
consciousness in lenns of the concepts that animate its various phenomenal fonns or points
of view. and from a standpoint which is in principle already science. Yet the movement and
result of this exposition is not something impose externally by the phenomenologist. As
Hegel states:
The necessary progression and interconnection of the fonns
of the unreal consciousness will by itself bring to pass the
completion of the series. To make this more intelligible. it
may be remarked...that the exposition of the untrue
consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative
14
procedure.ll
Obviously. given Hegel's criticism of Kant's epistemological method. along with his
insistence throughout the "Preface" and "Introduction" thai consciousness is movement and
dcvclopmenl he believes that the analysis and criticism oflhe concepts of knowing cannot
precede but musl aa:ompany their use. It is also the case that the "intercoMection" oflhe
fonns ofconsciousness must articulate. in a systematic manner, the entire series ofconcepts
lhat constitute the life of spirit. if a transition from "unreal" consciousness to scientific
consciousness is 10 be effected. The phenomenological exposition of finite or phenomenal
knowledge to the standpoint of absolute knowledge is more of the nature of an immanent
explication aflhe movement of what knowing is. rather than a critical inquiry which attempts
to establish what knowledge is prior 10 an actual knowledge ofanything.
In sununary. there are a nwnberofissuesarising out of Hegel's criticism of Kantian
t:pistemology. First. there is his concern with the methOO employ by traditional epistemology,
in particular the distinction it makes between our knowing and the object as it is in-itself.
Second. this distinction betwe('n what is true "for us" and what is true "in itself" cannot be
solved. contra Schelling, by making an added distinction between two kinds or knowledge,
one absolute and one finite. Finally if, as Hegel maintains. knowledge is one, it still must
reconcile its absolute standpoint with all the various phenomenal or finite rorms of its
appearance. This is the demand that knowledge be science or system. As such, a
phenomenological exposition must demonstrate the interconnection orall the various fonns
of phenomenal knowing as necessary moments in the development ofknowledge as such.
15
In other words. phenomenological exposition must sh.ow. contra Taylor. that the various
forms of finite consciousness are not exclusively aspei:ls or dimensions of human self-
consciousness itself. but the various forms of absolute knowledge in its self-education.
Thus the call for a phenomenological exposition in the "Introduction" to the
Phenomenology of Spirit is not perplexing. Science must be more than just an abstract
principle or staning point: it must also involve the development ofits principles in systematic
form. As Hegel explains:
In my view. which can be justified only by the exposition of
the system itself. everything turns on grasping and expressing
the True. not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.N
Later on he adds
That the True is actual only as system. or that Substance is
essentially Subject, is expressed in the representation of the
Absolute as Spirit...~
What exactly. then. do these enigmatic statements suggest about the fonn "truth" must take'?
They do imply. minimally at least, that the truth must be more than an infinite substance. an
original or immediate unity; that is to say, the truth must also include its concrete self-
d~...elopment.!6 But as the first of the two quotes also suggests. this can only be validated by
a complcte cxposition oflhe system itself. The implication of the statement is clear: a mere
principle. whether it be the principle of identity (A'"'A) or some other, cannot pass for
science. any more than the statement "all animals" can pass for zoological science.n In the
case of Schelling's principle of identity, for example, no account is given for difference, that
16
is to say. all difference is ultimately absorbed in the absolute standpoint. Whereas for Hegel.
difference or distinction is the acrual coment afthe sclf·manifestation ofspirit. Spirit is not.
as he states in the PhilQsophy of Mind,
...an essence that is already finished and complete before its
manifestation...but an essence which is truly actual only
through the specific forms of its netessary self-
manifestation...21
Difference. in other words. belongs to me very nature of spirit. But it is not a difference
which is construed as a mere instrument or vehicle of spirit Difference. otherwise put. as the
content oflhe self·manitestation of spirit. must be real as well as ideal. Hegel illustrates what
he means here in his analysis of the Christian adage; "God has revealed himselflhrough
Christ. his only-begotten Soo", He states:
...this statement properly means that God has revealed thallUs
nature consists in having a Son. i.e. in making a distinction
within himself. making himself finite. but in his difference
remaining in communion with himself, beholding and
revealing himself in the Son. and that by this unity with the
Son. by this being-for-himself in the Other. he is absolute
mind or spirit; so that the Son is not the mere organ of the
revelation but is himsclfthe content of tile revelation.2'I
So whal is other than spirit is not something eltternal to it, but rather the manifestation of its
o.....n content. Fonn and content, in other words.. are identical. For the purposes of the present
examination I take this 10 suggest that our consciousness ofobjects is oot merely a maner of
an empty fonn being added to an external content. Knowledge. accordingly, is not merely
the knowledge of reason as such. but as it is actually manifested in the world. lbat is to say.
knowledge is not merely knowledge of wbat knowing is or is noL for example, insofar as it
17
fonnulates the a priori conditions of all experience and action. but reason as it is actually
manifest in the entire range of activities which characterizes human experience - i.e.
consciousness. willing, religion. tethnology, etc. In the fonner instance philosophy is
fundamentally lhe critical inquiry by which we ascertain what the preconditions of a
particular experience are. and for which transcendental argument is aptly suited. But Hegel's
project in the phenomenglggy neSpjri! is different in that it goal is to effect a transition from
the merely subjective or phenomenological standpoint. to what he calls the absolute
standpoint or science. The phenomenology of Spirit in traversing the complete range of
human subjective consciousness. is attempting to bring 10 light the progress of the coming-
{O-b!;: of science. and is not. as Taylor suggests. attempting to establish me criterion and
limits which apply to particular notions ofexperiences - "sense<ertainty", "perception", ele.
The eoming-lo-be of science is nol.. for Hegel. an inquiry that sets down in advance what
knowledge itself is. II is not, as he states in the "Preface" to the phenomenology ofSpjrit,
·• ..all initiation of the unscientific consciousness into science".XI The phenomenological road
to science belongs to a consciousness that is already scientific in principle, and in
demonstrating lhe interconnection of all the various standplinlS of human subjeclive
consciousness. the single individual is Banded me ladder to science. In other words, in
revealing the logic of unscientific or finite consciousness phenomenological eXplsition
dTeclS a transition from the sphere of the mere appearing to know to actual knowledge,
which Hegel calls science.
But this procedure brings with it the Hegelian demand that philosophy immetse itself
18
in what it thinks and relinquish its merely subjective standpoint. of the I. the ego, which
merely catalogues and "pigeon-holes" and does not enter" .into the inunanent content afthe
thing .",3\ "Scientific cognition" declares Hegel:
...demands surrender to the life of the object or, what
amounts to the same lhing, confronting and expressing its
iMcr oecessity}2
Th.is can only be accomplished if the subject. the "I". relinquishes its position as the final
arbiter in all maners afknowledge and recognize itself as a moment in knowledge as such..
In olher words. in science thought is no longer deemed to be a mere subjective standpoint.
but an activity one ....ith the life afthe object itself - i.e. its concept. All arthis may seem to
be implausible or a retrograde step. Surely. it might be argued. the Kantian "I think", as
Charles Taylor himself will note in his essay "The Opening Arguments of the
Phenomenology". is an indubitable facet ofour experience as knowers. Yet here is Hegel
suggesting that thought is not simply the activity of the subject. the I. but that thought only
really thinks truth when it overcomes its own subjectivity and becomes one with what is
thought of. the concept. or as Hegel states it. when it enters ". .into the immanent rhythm of
the Notion".n
Hence. the real source of philosophical thinking for Hegel is the concept.
Philosophy's element is "... the actual. that which posits itself and is alive within itsclf'.J.I
Concepts represent the dynamic character ofthe object or reality itself and are not the rigid.
abstract categories of the understanding. In other words. concepts are not as they are for
Kant. merely fonns of synthesis pertaining to the given phenomena of intuition, by means
19
ofwnich objectivity is constiMed. For Hegel:" .things arc what they are through the action
or tile concept. immanent in them. and revealing itselfin them."lJ Kant's categories of me
understanding. accordingly. are viewed as simply a "...table of terms". wh.ich are externally
applied to a given matcrial.36 As Hegel explains in his History QfPhjlQSQphy, the individual
categories of the understanding, because they are empty on their own account.
...on1y have significance through their union with the given,
manifold material of perception. feeling, etc.. Such.
connection of sensuous material with categories now
constitutes the facts ofexperience. i.e. the matter ofsensation
after it is brought under the categories; and this is knowledge
generally.l1
In this Kantian sense concepts are simply the (annal determinations ofa thinking subject and
do not grasp the reality aCthe object itself. that is. they do not attach to the object apart from
our knowledge of it. But if. as Hegel insists, philosophy's element is the actual, which is the
life oflhe concept. then. as he also stales;
The detenninateness. which is taken from the schema and
externally anactled to an existent thing, is. in Science. the
self-moving soul of the realized content.]·
In other words. the determinateness that attaches to the content is nol imposed from without.
The concept is the soul of both consciousness and its object
Accordingly, in the PbeoomeoolgRY gfSpjrit the movement ofconsciousness in its
comprehension of the object is just as much a movement of the object itself as it is the
movement ofconsciousness. In the aniculation of its concept (the existence of the content,
or the being ofsomething for consciousness), consciousness becomes an other to itself, that
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is. it confronts its own immediate universality with a particular, objective other. But as Hegel
nOles. consciousness is also a "..taking back into itself this unfolding [efits contentl or this
existence Ofit...".l9 It is in this way, states Hegel.
that the content shows that its detenninaleness is not received
from something else. nor externally anached to iL but that it
determines itself. and ranges itself as a moment having its
own place in the whole..w
This is to suggest. in one respect at least. that there is not a given material on one side and
a set of detenninations on the other, which externally orders the material. In other words. lhe
coment of consciousness is not something that exists outside of me concept. but in a
fundamental sense is deduced from it. To quote the~ again:
We speak oflhe deduction ofa content from the notion. e.g.
of the specific provisions of the law of propeny from the
ootion of property; and so again we speak of tracing back
these material details to the notion.~l
Here. Hegel is again insisting that the concept is not the merely fonnal operation of thought,
but something which possesses a content of its own. And in giving itself this content, the
concept involves mediation. Le.....the ootion {concepti is what is mediated through itselfand
with itselr'.~~
In the Phenomenology ofSpjrit then, while there is a polarization ofconsciousness
and its object. they implicitly fonn a unity, where each must become other than itselfin
order to be all that it is. The concept, as the animating activity of the selfor consciousness,
realizes all that it is by penetrating everything other than itself, and sublating or negating this
other with itself. And conversely, the object becomes all that it is, in being thought. That is,
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in being thoughL the object is given the specific cbaracter imposed by its own concept. These
two movements form a unity. As Hegel explains. if the subsistence of a thing is its self-
identity. this is a pure abstraction (A=A). but this also is thinking (1=1). (n either case this
self-identity also involves a dissolution, .....the abstraction of itself from itself,.. .its own
becoming".~JThis process ofbccoming involves both substance and thought becoming other.
and 10 that end. substance must be something that is thought, and thought must think
substance. As Hegel might put it. true knowing is when spirit is "for-itself what it is in-
itself',
However. because ohhe tendency afme "'" to abstract from all ils content and set
itsclfup as n thed point. the demand that it give up this standpoint and immerse itself in its
objt.'tt seems to it to be an impossible requirement. Hegel calls this ratiocinative thinking,
and it is characterized by the fonn of judgemenl, as remarked earlier, which views the
determination ofa subject by a predicate as simply its doing. Typically in such judgement
a rigid distinction is drawn between the subject and its predicate. That is to say. the
judgement is thought of as involving two distinct elemenlS. a subject and it predicate. where
the subject is taken as separate from its predicate, and to which the predicate is externally
related. As Hegel notes in the~:
One's first impression about the Judgement is the
independence of the two extremes, the subject and lhe
predicate. 1be fonner we lake to be a thing or tenn per se, and
the predicate a general term outside the said subject and
somewhere in our heads.oW
[n ·'the Judgement.... then, thought can move endlessly back and forth attaching or
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detennining predicates to the subject as it sees fit. Because the subject's content is related to
it as its accidem. there is no necessity in its development. All detenninations of thought are
externally related to the subject of the judgement and to each other.
But Hegel contents that in a speculative proposition the unity of the judgemem is
taken to be primacy. and the two elements, subject and predicate. only the moments. For
example, in the statement "the actual is the universal". the predicate. "universal". is meant
to represent the essence oflhe "actual" and not merely something other which is predicated
of the "actual", 1llat is to say. it is understood to be the content or revelation afme "actual",
not merely something externally added 10 it. Just as in the statement "God has revealed
himself through Christ.. his only begonen Son", the Son is understood (0 be the content oftht:
revdation. The" universal"in the above statement is to be und~rstood as the content or
manifestation of the "actual". The point that Hegel is making here is that in speculative
judg~ments. unlike ordinary judgements. thought is not reflected into the empty "I" away
from lhe coment. Speculative propositions are not fonnal statements of the kind. S-is-P.
where S is understood to be what the judgement is about, and where P represents what is
attributed to the subject by someone doing the thinking. In a speculative judgement.
therefore. the subject is not a fixed point, simply supporting the predicates. Nor is there a
simple identification between the subject and the predicate. In a speculative proposition the
subj~ct passes over into the predicate. So in the above proposition "the actual is the
universa.l~. ~the actual~ is not a fixed point to which the predicate "the universal" is ascribed.
Instead "the universal" is meant to signify the essence of"tbe actual", and in a very important
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sense. in passing over into ~the universal" "the aetuaI" becomes what it truly is. In thinking
the "universal", then. we are not thinking something else, but that which the subje<:t. "the
actual". itself is.
Hegel devotes a fair amount ofeffort to explaining the differences between the two
kinds of judgements. a topic which might be perceived to have little relevance to
phenomenology. But what I think that Hegel is trying to show here is that in a speculative
judgement we see the dynamic character in things and that it is not necessary. therefore. that
we import our own adventitious ideas in order to comprehend things. Phenomenology need
not state. in advance. what the conditions ofknowing or science are. because it already has
embodied within it. its own principles. It is not necessary. as he states, "...10 clothe the
content in an external [logical] ronnalism".~l But it is also significam for another reason, in
that it also suggests that knowledge or science is not detennined solely by the demands of
the human subject, the "I think". In a speculative judgement the "I" relinquishes lbe
abstractness of its fixed slal1dpoint, as a detached ego, and immerses itself in what is
thought. In other words, in a speculative judgement, Ihought is no longer posited as a
subjective standpoint. but an activity which aniculates Ihe inherent dynamic of the object
itself - Le. its concept. For instance, the categories ofnature would not be merely fonns of
subjective consciousness. but are aniculations of the actual dynamic in nature:.
What. then. does this tell us about the development of science? Fundamentally. if
phenomenology is a recapitulation of the various expressions of finite consciousness, then
it is not something imposed externally by the phenomenologist. Rather. the path of the
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exposition springs from the very nature of consciousness itself. To be more precise.
phenomenology is an exposition afthe various fonns of finite consciousness in leons of the
concepts that enliven them.
Consciousness. states Hegel. contains two moments. to. knowing and the objectivity
negative to knowing". Accordingly consciousness is characterized by a disparity"...between
the I and the substance which is its object". While this can be regarded as their defect. it is
also however their"...soul. or that which. moves them".~ Thus. consciousness. in affinning
a cenain concept of knowing. finds itself plunged into contradiction. but discovers. in its
attempt to resolve the oppositions generated by this contradiction. new and more
comp~hcnsiw concepts of knowing. In other words, the development of pre·scientific
consciousness is possible because the conflict intrinsic to consciousness constantly forces
il out of every incomplete or partial slaJIdpoint. and reinstates it in a more complete fonn.
There is a constant movement back and fonh between what consciousness takes to be true
at one moment and that which is aclUally implied in what it takes itself to be. In this sense
we see that consciousness. for Hegel, is an inherently fonnative and dynamic activity. It is
this dialectical movement inherent in thought that gives rise to the entire series of
phenomenal forms ofconsciousness. which constitute the pathway to science, and is ind«d
science itself. This "arising and passing away" of various standpoints of subjective
consciousness. states Hegel.
...does not itself arise and pass away, but is 'in itself [i.e.
subsists intrinsically], and constitutes the actuality and the
movement of the life oftruth..n
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But what is of significance for phenomenological exposition is that consciousness
does not need to impose. in advance. its own detennination of what this will be.
Phenomenology is simply the recapitulation oflhis development from a standpoint which is
in principle science or actual knowing. It is important to note as well. as Hegel does., that the
disparity which exists in consciousness is also "...afthe substance with ilselr'.~· So the
disparity between the "I" and the object is both a deficiency on lite part of the "I" in relation
to its object. as well as a deficiency on the part of the object with respect to itself. The
disparity. then. between the object and "I". rather than being an impediment to knowing. is
the engine that drives it forward until spirit. as Hegel states:
...has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself
for its object just as it is, and the abstnlCt element of
immediacy. and of separation of knowing and truth. is
overcome.~9
In this manner. then. the whole series ofconcepts inherent in consciousness get articulated
and the pathway to science is established. This suggests lhat phenomenology is not an
t:ndlcss reflection on or contemplation of the validity of various notions ofexperience. as
Tsylor contends. but an attempt to achieve what Hegel calls an absolule standpoint or actual
knowledge.
Hegel sometimes refers [0 this pathway to science as a kind of journey which
consciousness must take in order 10 purify itself for the life of spirit. And at other times he
regards it as a pathway of doubt and despair. so This may seem like a peculiar way of
dt:picting this development., but ifone considers what is actually involved in the process, it
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is nOI at all an inappropriate characterization. That is to say. if the process is also seen as a
way of overcoming certain epistemological prejudices concerning the relationship of
consciousness and its object. specifically lheir distinction from one another. then the nOlion
of purification or catharsis is fining. But the process is also the pathway ofdespair because
from the standpoint of finite consciousness this development appears merely negative. a
scepticism destructive orits immediate standpoint. Yet it is DOt the kind ofscepticism which
is invoked in order to confinn one's own convictions. Such a scepticism. in Hegel's opinion.
;s not a 1nI1y fonnative process because it merely dispels those ideas which do not conform
to one's own. A Indy fonnative scepticism is one which, in Hegel's words. is a "determinate
negation". It docs not merely dispel ideas. but engenders new ones. nor does it result in a
"determinate nothingness". but is equally a positive outcome in that consciousness is elevated
to more complete fonn." This dialectical movement ofconsciousness. as we shall see below.
is crucial to the phenomenological exposition because it constitutes the pathway to science.
But as Werner Marx aptly points out, because this dialectical movement ofconsciousness
goes on behind the back of the consciousness engaged in experience itself. a specific role for
the phenomenologist can be assigned.'l Otherwise put. a role can be assigned to the
phenomenologist because he able to recognize that the development ofconsciousness from
one stage to the next is a dialectically necessary one, not merely a chance lX:currence. Marx
contends that it is for this reason that the pathway itselfcan be reckoned as itself science.
We. the phenomenologists. should pay attention to the
necessity of the movement, for this is what makes it
legitimate to describe even the presentation oflhe experience
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ofcOllS(:iousness • the road which flfSlleads to science proper
- as itselfa "science".S}
And through this presentation. accordingly. the phenomenologist is able. in Marx's view,
M ••• to persuade the contemporary natural consciousness...that in virtue of its own inherent
principle it could advance to science. ifonly it wanted to do SO".Sol
Ultimately. though. what is crucial for Hegel's position is that this scepticism be
thorough. that it bring about a state of utter despair in consciousness. The scepticism must
engender in consciousness a radical doubt concerning the possibility of any objective
standpoint. Consciousness must be brought. as it Wert, 10 the position where it sees "...the
untruth of phenomenal knowledge...",s, Only then can it realize that its own distinction from
an object existing separate and opposed to it. is really no distinction at all. As Hegel puts it
at the end of the "Introduction" to the Pheoomcoology nfSpjrit:
tn pressing forward 10 ilS true exislence. consciousness will
arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its semblance of being
burdened with something alien. with what is only for it. and
some son of 'other'. at a point where appearance becomes
identical with essence, so thai its exposition will coincide al
just this point with the authentic Science ofSpiril.56
The life of spirit. therefore. is not merely a subjective reality. but includes the objective as
\.'.dl. In this sense Hegel believes he has shown the limitations of the dualism presupposed
by traditional epistemological inquiry. But what Hegel has also purponed to have achieved
by the end of his phenomenological exposition is an absolute standpoint or aetuaI knowledge;
whereas transcendental argument only aniculates something about the nature ofour lives as
subjl:(;ts. that is. it merely supplies the norms and limits to panicular poinlS ofview of human
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subjective consciousness. and is not an acrual knowledge ofanything. Moreover, once one
set of problems has been explored, transcendental argument is always "enmeshed in another
set ofproblems"S7 concerning the nature aCthe subject. or the subject's place in the world.
This account of consciousness. it must be observed. corresponds to the Hegelian
claim that science is not just a starting point. but equally a result, which in tum touches upon
Hegel's continual demand that we free
...detenninate thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality
to the universal. and impart to it spiriluallife.S.
The various detenninalc thoughts that consciousness embodies in its phenomenal ronns are
nOI 10 be viewed as rigid and fixed, in isolation from each other. but in a dynamic
relationship. In any dctcnninate Conn. as previously mentioned. consciousness is involved
in a relalionsllip of itself with itself, but in such a way that it is also in contradiction with
itself. It can only recover its unity by reinstating itself in a morecompletc form. sublimating
within its new shape what was true in the former. Thus, every determination of thought
involves a relationship to a previous one, but more imponanlly for the development of
science. each also represents an advancement to another more comprehensive detennination.
What knowledge is.. accordingly. only emerges as consciousness develops and becomes more
cl~ar about itself. That is to say, consciousness can only grasp what it is, in a self-critical,
systematic development of it thoughts or concepts. This stands in contrast to the view that
Hegel is so critical orat the beginning of the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology QfSpjriJ •
the view which asswned that it is possible to set down, in advance, what knowledge is or is
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not.
III
If as Hegel suggests. then. phenomenological exposition represents the self-elevation
of knowledge 10 the standpoint of science. how is its~ different from the
epistemological procedures of which he is so critical in the opening passages of the
"Introduction"? He clearly wants to distinguish it from the methods of Kant, Fichte and
Schelling. Phenomenology. declares Hegel.
...will not be what is commonly Wlderstood by an initiation of
the unscientific consciousness into science; it will also be
quile different from the 'foundation' of science; least of all
will it be like the rapturous enlhusiasm which. like a shot
from a pistol. begins straight away wilh absolute
knowledge...S9
Now. as we have observed. in one manner at least Hegel believes phenomenology is different
from epistemology in thai both its movement and outcome are nOI imposed externally by the
phenomenologist. but originate in the very nature of consciousness itself. The series of
ph-;:nomenal fonns which consciousness undergoes and which uhimately culminates in
scientific consciousness is driven by its own intemallogic. Whal does this tell us about the
nature of phenomenological exposition? As suggested earlier. it is not some antecedent
m-;:thod. such as transcendental critique. but a kind of ancillary examination of the
development of phenomenal consciousness to the standpoint of science. I mean by this that
phenomenology. unlike transcendental argumenL does not step back from experience by
taking up a 'transcendenral' standpoint in order to examine it. To reiterate. this would be to
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[reat our cognitive life as some kind of'instrument' or 'medium' through which we discover
the truth. I have already mentioned Hegel's objections to this procedure. but it does highlight.
as well. Hegel's desire to move beyond the practice of referring questions afknowledge to
self-consciousness - to some detached. autonomous ego. This, I believe. is one reason why
Hegel adopts the tenn 'Spirit' when dealing with epistemological or ethical questions. Spirit
is a category that is meant to incorporate the objective as well as the subjective orders of
practical and cognitive life. Phenomenological exposition. unlike transcendental argwncnt.
does not assume a distinction between consciousness and the world or non-ego. but see them
as related tenns in all knowledge.
But the problem which always bedevils traditional epistemological investigations
now seems to pose a problem for phenomenological exposition as well. Hegel states:
If this exposition is viewed as a way of relating Science to
phenomenal knowledge. and as an investigation and
examination of the reality ofcognition, it would seem that it
cannot take place wilhoul some presupposition which can
serve as its underlying criterion.60
But this is just what Hegel claims is wrong with epistemology. namely. that it presupposes
exactly what it sets OUIto delennine, the possibility of knowledge. In other words. if we do
not know what knowledge is, then how can we have a criterion for testing whether something
is or is not knowledge? For me criterion itself, it would seem, must be some kind of
knowledge and we have the whole problem ofcircularity again. An alternative might be that
the criterion. in some way, be exempt from its own SWldards, but that would prescnt another
set of problems. If. for example, the criterion is exempt &om its 0....'0 standards then it would
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seem. on the face of it. that it must appeal to some other criterion and so on. But that would
ensnare us in an endless regress. Hegel. however. sees a solution to the quandary in the very
nature ofconsciousness itself.
Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from
something. and al the same lime relates itselfto it. ..and the
determinate aspect of this relating, or the being of something
for a consciousness, is knowing.61
Consciousness. then, by its very nature offers the possibility ofdetermining what knowing
is in the very activity of knowing itself. Knowing is a determinate relationship between
consciousness and its object. where the "...detenninate aspect of this relating. ". or the
criterion. is one that consciousness sets itself.
Consciousness. however, at least in its finite forms, is characterized by an inherent
conlliet: on the one hand it takes its object to be independent (lhe being-in·itself afthe
object), and yet on the other hand views it as something which stands in relation to it (the
being-for-consciousness afthe objett). Thus. consciousness is both the relating to, and the
distinguishing from an object. But there is always the difficulty as to whether the being-for·
consciousness ofan objett corresponds to the being-in-itselfof the objett. and this induces
it continually to seek an external criterion as the measure ofthis relationship. What, however.
consciousness does not yet realize is that the very distinction between the "in-itself' and the
"being-for-consciousness" of this "in-itself' is one consciousness itself makes. and which
dcscribes what consciousness itselfis. That is to say. the "in-itself' is really a concept which
consciousness employs to measure what it knows, and therefore is really a comparison of
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consciousness with itself: Thus. when consciousness draws the distinction between what is
"in-itself' and what is "for it" or the "being-for-consciousness" of the "in-itself'. it is
comparing its concept ofan object with the appearance of the object to consciousness. In
other words. it is the relation afthe "in-itself' and "for-eonsciousness" which is lrUe. and not
either taken as absolute
Now, ifphenomenological exposition is the investigation into the nature of knowing.
thl: problem. as noted above. of having to presuppose some external criterion is resolved by
the very nature ofconsciousness itself: As Hegel explains;
.. .in what consciousness affirms from within itselfas being-
in-itselfor the true we have the standard which consciousness
itself sets up by which to measure what it knows.6!
In sense-cenaiOlY. for instance. the "in-itself' or the uuth is considered to be the sensory
panicular. with which consciousness lakes itself to be in immediate relationship. But this
"being-in-itself" ofsense-certainty is a distinction that consciousness itselfmakes. and so the
criterion for testing wnether in sense-certainty the object is indeed the kind ofessence that
sense-certainty declares it 10 be. is immediately at hand. If consciousness as sense-certainty
cannot maintain its object in the way it declares it should. then it will be forced to recast itself
in a new, more comprehensive fonn, TIle crucial point in all of this is that both the measure
of wnal is true and the knowing of it equally belong 10 consciousness, But as we nave
observed. in this self-testing. both what is known and the criterion by which it is measured
are constantly being modified. that is. they are being recast in a more complete fonn. Thus
wnat consciousness takes 10 be true at one stage - an independent "in-itself"- at another stage
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it recognizes as true only for it- the "being-for-consciousness" of this "in-itself". But in each
case of finite consciousness the "being.for..consciousness" of the "in-itself" straightaway
resolves itself into something which is taken 10 be true and independent. For finite
consciousness. tben. no one fonn is ever adequate; it inevitably goes beyond itself,
progressing from one fonn ofconsciousness 10 another more complete. The culmination of
this movement. as the phenomenologist knows. is absolute knowing, that is, a knowing
whidl is not burdened with a content external and alien to it. It is the point where
consciousness. to employ Hegel's lenninology. is "in and for itself". or" .where appearance
become identical with essence".f>l
This self-eritical developmcm of consciousness. Hegel calls "experience", It is
characterized by the movement ofconsciousness described above. where what consciousness
recognizes at one stage as an "in·itseU" at another stage is recognized as the "being·for-
consciousness" of the "in-itself", In the transition from the fonner to the laner stage.
consciousness is directed back onto itselfand is thereby able to have experience of itself by
way of the object, In the "Preface" 10 the Phenomenology of Spiri! Hegel stales;
And experience is the name we give to just this movement in
which the immediate, the unexperienced. Le. the abstract
whether it be of sensuous [but still uosensed ] being. or only
thought ofas simple, becomes alienated from itself and then
rerums 10 itself from this alienation., and is only then revealed
for me first time in its acruality and truth. just as it then has
become a propeny ofconsciousness also,~
Again in the "lntroduction":
Inasmuch as the new true object isnJesfrom it, this dialectical
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movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which
affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is
called experience.6l
In this way. then. the examination which consciousness perfoons on itself is a formative one.
that is 10 say. through its self-critica.l examination it is able to form itself out of itself.
This a different view of 'experience' than that expounded by Kant. For Kant•
.experience'. in brief, is the formal synthesis enacted by the "I" conferring a merely fonnal
unity on sense particulars. Accordingly. the categories of the understanding only have
meaning through their union with a given manifold ofinruition. As Hegel states of them in
the Uis10ry ofPhjlQSOphy:
Thinking understanding is thus indeed the source of the
individual categories, but because on their own account they
are \'oid and empty. they only have significance through their
union with the given. manifold material ofperception. feeling,
etc..oo
In other words. human 'experience' is constituted by a sensuous manifold unified and
organized by the concepts of the wx1erstanding. But this unity is ach.ieved only subjectively,
that is 10 say. the "objectivity" of experience only refers 10 !he order imposed subjectively
through the collaboration ofour intuition and understanding. To quole Hegel again:
...objectivity oflhought in Kant's sense, is again 10 a certain
extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although
universal and necess'll)' categories, are only our thoughts •
separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists
apart from our knowledge.67
Hegel makes two further observations on this issue that are relevant to the present
investigation. First, he notes, for Kant:
35
...experience grasps phenomena only. and that by means of
the knowledge which. we obtain through experience we do not
know things as they are in themselves, but only as they are in
the Conn oflaw5 of perception and sensuousness.6I
And second. as he observes it the~:
...Reason supplies nothing beyond the [onnal unity required
10 simplify and systematize experience; it is a canon, not an
organon. of truth. and can furnish. only a crilicism of
knowledge, not a doctrine aCthe infinite.6'l
That is. science in Kant's account ofit is merely the endless quest for an ideal totaJity of
empirical or phenomenal knowledge. not its actual accomplishment.
H~gd'sownviewof'experience' diff~considerably from Kanl's. First, experience
does not depend upon some antecedent condition. like the Kamian forms of intuition, for
I:xample. Hegel's account of experience is expressly [onnative in nature. later stages
incorporate and build upon earlier ones. Werner Marx nOles in this regard:
Above and beyond Kant's apperception, the concept as
presented in the Phenomenology· directed IOwards the 'In.Le''
in dialectical movements ofexperience. constantly growing,
and completing itself in the tdos ofabsolute trulh· is able to
produce the shape ofa system.1O
Secondly. and related to the this first conunenl, experience for Hegel is not the mere striving
after knowledge, but its actual accomplishment. But "ac1Ual knowing" can only be realized
in the "systematic exposition" of the series of phenomenal fonns which consciousness
embodies. While this exposition is provided by the phenomenologisl, it is only possible in
the first instance because of the fonnative character ofexperience itsel[
Unlike the Kantian notionofexpericnce. which is antecedently determined by the a
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priori conditions of its possibilil)'. Hegel's notionofexpcrience ~Iops and enriches itself
",ith every advancement it makes along the pathway to science. later stages ofexperimce
~ the resuh ofearlier ones and in tum provide the basis for the furtherdevelopmenl ofother
stages. As Werner Marx aptly observes:
.•.10 say that in each case the new obj~t • and the shape it
dctennines· is nothing else but the "experience gained" rrom
the preceding object (in its ~vious shape ofconsciousness),
is 10 say in fact that these experiences together Conn a chain.71
But in the exposition of the movement of consciousness from its experience of lhe first
object to me emergence ofa new one for it., there is. as Hegel stales., "...a moment in virtue
ofwhi.::h it does not seem to agree with what is ordinarily ww1entood bycxperience".n Why?
Because the development ofconsciousness from one 5landpoint to another. which has the
fenner sublatro within il is not one which Ofdinary consciousness understands as an actual
dc\'e1opmenL This is Wldt1starldatMe given the formative natW"e ofconsciousness. Obviously
the later stages in its development are able to comprehend things about preceding~ that
are not present to these preceding stages. Ordinary consciousness. accordingly. merely takes
its new object as something it discovers by chance. It is invariably convinced that the
development from one standpoin11O~ is a merely negative proc6S., a loss rather than
:I. gain. Sense-certainty, for example, in going over into perception merely feels the 1051 of
its object - the ·"this~ - and regards the emergence of the new object of perception as mere
foltuitousness. Sense-certainty. thus. views the supersession of its standpoin1 by another
merely as a refutation or reversal. and not as a genuine development or neccssaty result But
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from the phenomenological slandpoint it is precisely the opposite. As Hegel explains:
From the present viewpoint, however, the new object snows
itself to have come about through a reversal ofconsciousness
itself. This way of looking at the matter is something
contributed by ~ by mean of wh.ich the succession of
experiences through which consciousness passes is raised into
a scientific progression • but it is not known to the
consciousness thai we are observing.13
The movement of consciousness. then. is only for us • Le. the phenomenologist· and in
comprehending the logic of these phenomenal forms of consciousness. absolute knowing
comes to understand what it itself is. In a very real sense, then. in tracing out all the various
fonns or determinations thai consciousness passes through. phenomenological reflection is
taken up into its movement and completes it - i.e. elevates it to the standpoint of science.
To reiter,nc. this self-critica1. dialectical development of consciousness is not
something imposed eXlemally by the phenomenologist "...since notion and object. the
criterion and what is to be tested. are present in consciousness itself...". 7~ Phenomenology
belongs to a consciousness that, in principle. is already scientific. in thai what it knows is the
succession of phenomenal fonns of itself. In reflecting on and comprehending the logic of
this development. one might say that the phenomenologist is bearing witness to the self-
education of knowing. In other words, phenomenological exposition is not something which
is extemally affixed to the various fonns of finite consciousness, nor does it ground them in
some absolute standpoint. Ralber it is the self..education of knowing in relation to irs own
genuine foundations.
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Chapter Two
Transcendental Argument: Its Structure as Argument
and its Parallels in Phenomenology
I
What Taylor takes '1ranscendental argument" [0 be. and why he believes Hegel"s
phenomenology is transcendental in ronn will be the subject ormis chapter. In Section One
I v.ill examine Taylor's account ofthe nature oftranseendental argument. and why he takes
it to be significant as argument. In Section Two the focus will be on the specific reasons why
Taylor considers the opening passages afthe Phenomenology QfSrid! as lranscendental in
form. I will conclude by arguing that this reading does not agree with Hegel"s own view of
his work as outlined in the "Preface" and "Introduction"10 the Phenomenology o[Spjrit. as
well as with his thinking in the.l.J:1&k and the philosophy QfMjnd.
Taylor does not in his paper"The Opening Arguments of The Phenomenology of
Spine', provide a detailed account of the nature oftrnnscendental argument. but confines
himself to a brief working definition.
By "transcendental argument"' I mean arguments that start
tmm some putatively undeniable facet of our experience in
order to conclude that this experience must have certain
features or be ofa certain type. for otherwise this undeniable
facet could not be. 1
For this reason it will be necessary. ifwe want a bener understanding of what Taylor means
by transcendental argument to use another ankle of his. "The Validity ofTrnnscendental
Arguments." There he provides a more detailed account of the nature of transcendental
arguments and why he considers them valid pbilosophically. Here too he begins with a
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definition:
The argwnents I want to call "transcendental" stan from some
lea-ture ofour experience wtticn they claim to be indubitable
and beyond cavil. They then move to a stronger conclusion.
one concerning the nature of the subject in the world. They
make this move by a regressive argument, to the effect that
Ihe stronger conclusion must be so if the indubitable fact
about experience is to be possible ( and being so, it must be
possiblef
Both definitions describe. according to Taylor. transcendental arguments of the Kantian
variety. That is to say. they spedfy transcendental arguments as regressive arguments which
seek 10 establish the necessary conditions ofcertain indubitable facets ofour experience. As
such. they hinge upon being able to identify certain undeniable characteristics of experience
in order then to demonstrate the necessary conditions of these apparent, undeniable facets of
experience.
Now it is Taylor'sjudgement that transcendental arguments ofthe Kantian form. and
all other versions for that matter. appeal as "bedrock"lo two basic aspects of experience:
...its unity (reflected in the faci that the"l think.~must be able
10 accompany all my representations) and its polarization
between subjecl and object ( wlUch requires some fonn of
objectivity, that is. a distinction between the way things are
and the way they seem).,,)
All transcendenlal argwnents. in Taylor's view. treat consciousness as the primary and
inconlrovenible elemenl of experience. but simultaneously they make a radical distinction
belween this consciousness as subjective and an objective reality about which it thinks,
While 'objeclivity', in the Kantian sense. refers to the representations brought under the
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subjective categories. Taylor is here stressing the radical polarity between subject and object.
and thus 'objectivity" also refers to the in-itself 'beyond' consciousness. and as such the
radically 'other' orthe object.
Yet. it iSjUSl this characterization ofconsciousness as primarily or exclusively the
activity of a subject seI OV(I' against an objective reality, as something other. thaI Hegel
characterizes as finite or phenomenal knowing, not an actual knowing or science. Mo~ver.
a procedure wruch rests on a subjec:t-object distinction is., for Hegel. one which is flawed. in
that it can never overcome this initial dualism once it has been assumed. Hegel. however. is
not suggesting that there is no subject-object relationship in experience. As he stales in the
phl!nomeoolQ!!Y ofSpiril:
Consciousness simultaneously dUlinguisMs itself from
sonYthing. and at the same time nloles itself to it. or. as it is
said. this something exists for consciousness: and the
detenninatc a.spect of this relating. or of the being of
something for a consciousness. is btow;',g.~
What Hegel abjures is the: Mpolarization.. of consciousness and its object The: notion that
knowing is only the relationship of consciousness, as something fixed and independent. and
its obj~t as something other about which it thinks· whether it is a chair. man or God - is one
which Hegel does not affinn.
Thoughts. according to Kant. although universal and
necessary categories. are only our thoughts - separated by an
impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our
knowledge. But the true objectivity of1hinking means that the
thoughts. far from being merely ours. must at the same time
be the real essence ofthe things, and of whatever is an object
to us.'
4\
The true nature afthought, for Hegel. is to be found in a wider or larger context than
th~ merely formal categories of subjective consciousness espoused by Kant. Both the
spiritual·hwnan order. recounted in the Phenomenology ofSpjrit, and nature are seen in the
context ora larger whole - i.e. the"divine Idea"or Logos. In the~ Hegel observes:
...the true and proper case oLthings. finite as they are. is to
have their existence founded nOI in themselves but in the
universal divine Idea.6
ThisditTerence between Hegel and Kant can be seen. for example. in the view of nature that
each articulates. For Kant. nature is ••...nOI a thing in itself but...merely an aggregate of
appearances. so many representations of the mind",' Nature, in other words. is detennined
throughout. in its form. by the a priori conditions dictated by the nature of human cognition.
The category of nature. accordingly, is nothing else hut a feature of human self·
consciousness itself. For Hegel. on the other hand. nature is underslOod as the "universal
divine Idea" appearing or unfolding itselfas a mindless outWardness. in which all things are
mutually external to one another· Le. things are spatial and temporal. In other wonts. for
Hegel. nature is the whole order of philosophical concepts regarded as an external system
of being. In the "Introduction" 10 the PhjloSOPhy ofMjnd he declares:
External Nature, too. like mind, is rational. divine. a
representation of the Idea. But in Nature. the ldea appears in
the element ofasunderness. is external not only to mind bUI
also to itself. precisely because it is external 10 the actual,
self-existent inwardness which constitutes the essential nature
ofmind.'
Nature. then. in the both the lJ!&ik and Philosophy of Mind which form a part of the
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pl1ilosophical sciences proper, is construed within the larger context afrhe "divine Idea", and
not merely as a subjective reality only.
For Hegel. then. all the categories ofnature and the spiritual-human order are not a
subjective reality only, nor concomitantly is the radical distinction between a subjective and
objective order. made by Kant and other transcendental idealists. absolute. This is the thesis
Hegel attempts to work out in the phenomenQlogy of Spirit. In it Hegel attempts to
reconstruct or recount the logic implicit in 'knowing', a process by which consciousness
evemually realizes that the polarity between the knowing subject and an objective order.
existing independent of it. is actually no distinction.
My concern. however. is not whether Hegel actually works this thesis out. but
whether. as Taylor suggests, Hegel is engaged in transcendental argument, and whether we
can understand this project to be similar in bent to much ofcontemporary philosophy whose
notion of human experience is, like Kant, strictly identified with self-conscious reason· i.e.
strictly a facet of human self~onsciousness itself. Is Hegel then. in the Pbenomeoo!ogy gf
Sairil. occupied with showing that the principles of human knowledge and action have their
ground in individual self~onsciousness alone - in the .., think"· as Taylor suggests. or is he
attempting 10 show that they must be viewed within the more comprehensive context of
Spirit?
Now Taylor's discussion of the validity of transcendental argwnents, as already
indicated. takes the ,,' think"and the "polarization" between subject and object to be the
indubitable features ofexperience, which provide the underpinning for any transcendental
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argument. While the .., think" and the polarization between subject and object fonn the
"bedrock" common to different versions of transcendental argument. any particular
lransccndcnlal argument need not start from them per se. What these two features represent,
lor Taylor. are the most basic constituents of experience as such. Without these two
undeniable features of experience. argues Taylor, we could not be said 10 possess an
awareness or grasp ofobjects and events. even in the most minimal of senses. and thus could
nOI be said to have experience. 1be polarization between a subj«tive and objective order of
things. for example. is required betaUSC' without it our experience would not be ofanything.
An experience that is without an object is recognized. Taylor contends......10 be an
impossibilily",q As we shall observe subsequemly, the initial -indispensability claims"
concerning experience are. for Taylor, a kind of insight thaI we all -just see" and recognize
as being constitutive of experience as such. IU
Thus transcendental arguments are meant to say something about our general
experience as subjects and not just about this or that particular experience. whether. for
example. we experience a cold sensation in winter. or that our eyes water when we peel
onions. Kant's argument for the necessary applications of the categories. to give a well
known example. is meant to affinn something about the nature of any experience which
distinguish~s between a subjective and objective order of things.
It is a claim about the nafure ofour experience and thought.
and of all those functions whicb are ours qua subject, rather
than about the empirically necessary conditions of these
functions. 11
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While transcendental argwnertts do not foreclose other possible explanation ofexperience.
in -reductive mechanistic" terms for instance. Taylor believes that they are highly significant
for our own self-wxIerstanding as political, social, linguistic bcings..l~ HoYt'eVet". in my view.
this also means. contra Hegel. that the self-understanding of the individual mUSl also be
explicated entirely within lhc: dimension ofhuman subjectivity. lbat is to say. all accounts
of individual experience: must invoke our own self·Wlderstanding and ultimately be nothing
else but a facet of human subjectivity itself.
If we take Hegel at his word that the spiritual-human order is 10 be understood within
the broader context oCa "divine Idea" or Spirit how is it that Taylor can speak of Hegel's
work as transcendental in form. especially given Taylor"s concomitant claim that all such
arguments rest on the "'polarization- ofsubject and object. and ate also strictly a facet ofthc
unity ofhuman self-consciousness itself -. the"l think'"? 1be answer to this question can
only be furnished. if it can be furnished at all. if we have a fuller understanding of what
Taylor means by tr'amCmdentai argument, and ofhow and what that kind ofargument proves
about experience itself.
Taylor identifies thr'ec features oftranseendental arguments which he thinks require
explanation and justification: 1. they are a series of indispensa.bility claims: 2. transcendental
arguments. as a series of indispensability claims, are a priori and apodictic: 3. they are
arguments that appertain to experience. The first feature affmns that transcendental
arguments are ones that move, by regress. from an indubitable feature ofexperience 10 a
-stronger conclusion". While these steps an: identified by Taylor as -conclusions", they arc:
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more in the nalure of claims or theses concerning the condition of the possibility of the
iniliaL indubitable feature of experience. Together these "conclusions" (onn a series of
"indispensability claims", each claim building on the prior. They are considered to be
"indispensability claims" in that they, to quole Taylor:
...move from their starting points 10 their conclusions by
showing thai the condition stated in the conclusion is
indispensable to the feature, identified at the Star\.ll
It is Taylor"s view that the move to a stronger conclusion lells us. as he stales in his
definition of lranscendental arguments. something aboul .....the nature of the subject or the
subject" 5 position in the world", 14 Clearly. indispensability claims are statements concerning
Ihl: necessary conditions ofexperience. or otherwise put, statements about what the structure
of the subject must be like in order to have the experiences we do have. As a move from
some indubitable feature of experience to a stronger conclusion, a transcendental argumem
attempts to deduce those conditions that are considered necessary for experience. Thus
lranscendental argument only works as argument if it can be sh.own that the conditions
reach.ed are necessary, and if we can aJso identify certain facets of experience that are
indubitable and beyond cavil.
A further component of the initiaJ featwe of transcendental argumem is that the
indubitable features of experience. which form the basis of any transcendental argument,
must themselves be indispensability claims. According to Taylor they are indispensable
because experience must be coherent or inlelligible to be experience. A favorite example of
Taylor's is Maurice Merleau·Ponty's argument that as subjects we are essentially embodied
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agents. This claim about the nature of our experience does not rest on any empirical
evidence. but on the nature of our perception. Perception is regarded as an undeniable or
indispensable aspect oCcur life as agents aware ora world. To quote Taylor:
I can be aware aCthe world in many ways. I can be pondering
the situation in Namibia or last year at Marienbad,
considering the second law of thennodynamics. and so on.
But the one way ofhaving a world which is basic to all this is
my perceiving it Ii'om where l am, with my senses, as we
say.IS
That is \0 say. it would be impossible 10 speak of experience in any significant sense if
perception were not involved. Accordingly, without some kind of perception. for example.
an up-down orientation. we could not speak ofexperience at all. not in any intelligible sense,
and we just~ thai this is so. And it is because perception necessarily involves embodied
agency thai we can thus conclude thaI as subjects we are also essentially embodied agents.
The crucial point to remember, though, is that transcendental arguments, of whatever
version, all appeal to some indispensable feature of experience. "Sense<enainty",
accordingly. if it is a transcendental argument as Taylor claims, will also have to start from
some indispensable feature of experience. Specifically, it will have to start from the basic
starting point that to know is to be able to say what it is we know. Why? Because. as he
slales:
An experience about which nothing at all could be said, not
even that it was very difficult if not impossible to describe,
would be below the threshold of the level ofawareness which
we consider essential for knowledge...It would have been
either lived unconsciously, or else have been so peripheral
that we had or could recover no bold OD it. It
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Wejust~thistobeso.
Plainly, the initial indispensability claim of a transcendental argument is not
indispensable to some prior claim because it tbnns the starting point afthe argument. In
other words. it is not a conclusion. drawn by way ofargument, indispensable to some prior
position. Its SlaNS as an indispensability claim, therefore. must relate to something else. This.
as we nave seen. pertains to the fact that such claims supposedly delineate certain features
of experience that we self-evidently see to be essential for even the most minimal of
experiences. They articulate, as it were. an insight into experience that we all recognize to
be essential to experience as such. Kant's transeendenlal deduction. for example. starts from
the insight that experience must have an object; that is. that experience must be ofsomething.
This insight is one that we aU are supposed to recognize as essential to experience as such.
and wilhoUi which experience could nOI be constituted in any meaningful sense. In other
words. it is something that we Wlderstand to be self-evident. or undeniable. This is the
sl:cond det~rrnining feature of transcendental arguments.
There are twO essential elements to the second feature ofttanscendental arguments
. First. they must be a priori and apodietic. Secondly. as a series of indispensability claims.
transcendental arguments are supposed to be self-evident As apodictic claims.
transcendental arguments are concerned with what must be the case about the nature of
experi~nce.and as a priori claims they must be unmixed with anything empirical. Following
Kant. these a priori claims must possess universal and necessary validity and be known by
reason alone. In reviewing Merleau-Pooly's claim that we are essentially embodied agents
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Taylor affinns as much. This claim. he: states. is
...about the nolurt or our experience and thought. and of all
those functions which are 0Ul'i qua subject, rather lhan about
UK empirically necessary conditions of these functions. To
say that we are essentially embodied agents is to say that it is
essential to our experience and thought lhat they be those of
embodied beings. 11
So the claim that we are essentially embodied agents is derived from the -nature- ofour
experience as subjects. and not from the fact that we possess cenain corporeal features.
Funhermore we see that this insight into our experience as subjects is one wh.ich is self-
~videntJy true. Thus. as a self-evident statement. an indispensability claim is understood to
be one which does not require an appeal to other evidence. it must be something we ~just
5«-. This is panicularly true. as indicated above, for the first indispensability claim in a
transcendental argumenL Concrming the first step in Kant's transcendental deduction. for
example. Taylor declares:
We just 1ft thai experience: must be of something to be
experience. or thai. the "I think- must be atHe to accompany
all my represcntation...We are meant 10 sec with equal clarity
that there can"t be experience of something unless it is
coherent: or that there can't be coherence if the categories
don't apply."
The first claim, then. is one wejust see or immediately apprehend. requiring no funher proof
or confinnation. but which nevenbeless depends upon cenain Q priori. necessary conditions
for its possibility.
Why, then.do~ needmmscendcnlal~t?(fa claim is self-evident. it would
seem not to require any demonstration. Taylor would agree, Transandenlal argwnctIts are
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not meant 10 demonstrate thai something is possible. but rather show~ and~ it is
possible, by demonstrating thai what is proved is a necessary condition of experience.
Transcendenla1 argumenls. as Taylor indicates, ....fannulate boundary conditions we all
recognize". and a proper fannulation will insure their validity - Le......8 correct fannulation
will be self-evidenlly valid".l~
The self-evident nature afme initial indispensability claim then, and for that matter
of all such claims. is grounded in the very activity of subjective experience itselr. Our
activities as conscious agents provide the framework. as it were. for the fannulation of
transcendental arguments. starting from an initial self-evident truth and moving on, by
regress. to spell out more exactly what is involved in the initial claim. As we shall s« later.
Taylor understands this inability 10 Cannulate a reasonable doubt about lhese experiences 10
be due to the fact that they articulate .....an insight we have into our own activity",2ll This
brings us to the third feature of transcendental arguments.
As a series of apodictic indispensability claims, transcendental arguments must
pertain to the nature of experience as such. If indispensability claims an: not about
~xperience. insists Taylor. then transcendental argwnenlS do not have the unchallengeable
anchor lhey require. They require such a mooring because if the initial point ofdepanure is
in some way in doubt. then so is eve!)' other claim in the sequence. As Taylor explains it:
For an argwnent thai 0 is indispensable for C. which is
indispensable for B, which is indispensable for A, tells us
nothing defmitive about the status of D. unless we already
know the status of A.!l
so
Because we cannot" .fannulate coherently the doubt that we have experience", asserts
Taylor. the initial indispensability claim. which itself pertains to experience. secures the
whole series,n But the initial indispensability claim in a transcendental argument is
indubitable because it is undentood to be an insight into the most basic sense of what
constitutes experience.
Two matters at this point, however obvious, warrant a comment. First. because
experience. in this account. only pertains to or is limited to our own subjectivity.
transcendental arguments only disclose to us the nature ofour experience as subjects. To put
this somewhat differently. transcendental arguments are restricted to the analysis of human
experience. whether this be cognitive. existential. etc., and say nOlhing about the nature of
things in themselves. Set:ond. and intimately related to this first poim. there isan underlying
principle operating here thaI the concepts of knowing that animate the various finite forms
of consciousness only have meaning or significance as connected with the certainty of the
initial insights we have about ourselves as subjects. If we take the Kantian insight that the
"1 think" must accompany all ofour representations, then the application of the categories
of the understanding is seen to bea necessary feature ofthis experience. But it is reciprocally
the case that the application of the categories has significance only in cOMection with this
undeniable feature ofexperience - i.e. the unity of self-consciousness. whereby we recognize
that all our experiences are ours. The two sides, as it were, condition one another. The
application of the categories is seen as making the unity of the "I think" possible, and
reciprocally. because the "I think" is something we cannot challenge. for it is an undeniable
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feature ofour experience as subjects. the necessary application of the categories must hold.
But what this also means is that the categories or concepts of the understanding are limited
to experience. that is 10 say. they refer only to experience. Concepts for Kant, lo give the
obvious example. are merely fonns of synthesis pertaining to the given phenomena of
intuition.
Inasmuch as uanscendental arguments. then. are a series of indispensability claims
which concern experience. Taylor believes they possess an unchallengeable anchoring. But
despite Taylor's contention iliat "what they show things 10 be indispensable to can't be
shrugged ofr.!J the apodictic or self-evident nature of indispensability claims is ambiguous.
Typically we view a self-evident claim as one that does not require proof, a claim that is
open to direct apprehension. Yet Taylor maintains that it does require demonstration. If we
jusl~ that experience must be oCa eenain Iype orchatacter. as Taylor insists. why do self-
~vid~n[ claims require demonstration? Similarly, if indispensability claims are supposed to
be apodictic. why is there Wlcenainty about them, especially given that they are supposed to
be self-evidenl as well? Taylor aptly queries: .....what grounds the apodietic certainty or the
self-evidence Ihat these claims are supposed to enjoy?,,!4 The concise answer is that
indispensability claims are:
...groWlded in our grasp of the point of our activity. that grasp
we must have to carty on the activity. They articulate the
point. or cenain conditions ofsuccess and failure; and we can
be cenain that they do so rightly. because 10 doubt this is to
doubt that we are engaged in the activity, and in this case such
a doubt is senseless.!S
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An activity. explains Taylor. has a point and as such there are essential features 10 it.
which ifabscnt would cancel the purpose oftlr activity. That is to say. these features are
constitutive of the activity, and not merely, as Taylor remarks. a -verbal maner. While
certain features of an activity may be simply a matter ofclassification in order to distinguish
it from other activities. constitutive fearures are essential components of tile activity which
cannot be omitted. Now. as Taylor goes on 10 argue. in cenain activities the agent's insight
into the point of the activity is essential to the activity. This is all the more so where the
activity involves ••.. a degree ofconsciousness and understanding".l~ Moving the pieces on
a chess board. to usc Taylor's example. would be meaningless and void the point of the
game. \\-tlich is to capture your opponent's king pie«. if moving the pieces did not involve
any knowledge aCthe rules oCme game ofchess. Even ifour moving of the pieces on the
chess board ~ned 10 coincide with a Icga.l set of moves. it could not be.said that we Wert
playing chess if\o\'e lacked the under5tandingofthe point of tile activity. Out understanding
the rules ofme game ofchcss is thus a constitutive feature of that activity. Now it might be:
that. in sante instantts. not all points of an activity will be obvious 10 us. but we
ncvcnheless must have some understanding of what we are doing. or at least we must be:
implicitly aware of the point ofour activity. We may play chess badly. for example. but we.
nonetheless. are still aware ofthc rulesofme game and understand their significance for the
game. So the playing of the game of chess not only involves a set of rules which are
constitutive of the game. but also includes as a constitutivef~ the agent's awareness of
me point ofmis activity. Thus., uour awareness of the nUcs ofcbess is constitutive of that
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game. it is, claims Taylor
...hard to see how one could make sense of the doubt that we
know how to play chess and are now playing it.H
Clearly. for Taylor. any kind ofdoubt here. even hyperbolic doubt. does not make sense. We
cannot be engaged in playing the game of chess with others and still form a coherent doubt
as to whether we know how to play the game ofchess. In this sense. argues Taylor. the grasp
which we have of our own activities is indubitable and self-evident. This means that a
constitutive feature or condition ofexperience is that we be able 10 understand and articulate
what it is we are doing.
Raben Pippin makes a similar observation in Hegel's Idc:alism- The: Satjsfactions of
Seif-ConsciQusoess. Like Taylor, Pippin argues that for Kant there are basic conditions or
claims involving icknfity. unity, and self-consciousness which must be fulfilled if a subject
ofexpcrience can be said 10 have '·experiences...~1 Like Taylor. Pippin also argues that for
Kant having a grasp ofour own activities is a condition ofexperience bttause these activities
- n:membering. perceiving. thinking. etc. - would otherwise not belong 10 us as subjects.
Pippin states:
Being able to ascribe stales to myself and to become
conscious of the principles of unification by means ofwhich
I effect a unitary experience is not simply a distinct reflective
ability I happen 10 possess. It is a condition of experience
because. according to Kant. experience itself is "implicitly"
reflexive.:!'I
In other words. in any conscious tnteoding, whether it be a claim to knowledge or a
justification for a particular action. there is a connection between our self-understanding of
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thai intending and the possibility of that intending in the first place. Pippin uses the example
of someone attempting 10 give a moral justification for an action. Obviously a moral
justification for an action can only count as a moral one if there is such a thing as the
institution of morality. But. argues Pippin. the individual's self-understanding of what the
institution of morality demands is equally a precondition ofa -moral" justification for an
actionJO• That is to say. our self·understanding of what the institution of morality demands
is a condition of moral action. and. as Taylor contends. transcendental arguments aniculate
or delineate these boundary conditions.
Transcendental arguments aniculate an insight we have imo our activity of being
aware of OUf world. even if it is the case thai our awareness is only of ~.. ,impressions.
appearances. real physicaJ objects or whatever',.ll Now the activity of being aware of our
world. according to Taylor's argwnenl, requires that we be able to recognize cenain
conditions of failure. such as a lack of coherence in our perception of things. These
conditions are not something we fonnulate prior to the activities themselves. but we must
nevertheless have some grasp of what il is 10 have a breakdown in our a~ness. For it
could not be said that we were aware in the first place if we could not recognize this. And
so. insists Taylor:
I may hyperbolically doubt whether my memory of chess
playing is not a confused dream...But l cannot fonnulate a
coherent doubt whether I'm aware in the sense ofconscious,
awake, and grasping something. Transcendental argwnents
aniculale indispensability claims concerning experience as
such.n
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Like Rene Descanes. Taylor is expressing the insight that, though we may reasonably doubt
all else. we who do the doubting cannot doubt that we think; we cannot doubt our own
consciousness or awareness. Still for Taylor. as with Kant. what we are conscious of.
"impressions, appearances." etc.• are grounded solely in the nature of our consciousness
itself. In other words. all being is being·for-consciousness. and what things are in themselves
remains problematical. Merleau.Pomy's argument, to cite a previous example. that it is a
necessary condition ofour being perceptual agents that we be embodied as well. does not.
in Taylor's view. establish that we are in fact embodied agents. Nor. as he also points out.
docs it exclude other possible accounts of perception. fOf instance. in reductive
neurophysiological tenns. lJ Clearly, then. transcendental arguments establish or aniculate
som~thing about the subject of experience of the world, but because they are restricted to.
or grounded in the nature of experience they can never preclude other possible accounts of
what underlies that experience.
Hegel. however. is critical of this Kantian phenomenological standpoint.
Thoughts. according 10 Kant, although universal and
necessary C8regOries.. are only ours thoughts - separated by an
impassable gulf from the thing. as it exists apart from our
knowledge. :>I
But. he quickly adds•
...the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far
from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real
essence of the things, and ofwhatever is an object to us.JJ
How. then. are we to judge Taylor's conlention thaI Hegel's argument in the first three
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chapters oCtile Pbmomrno1ogy Q(Spjrit is transcendental in fonn?
If as Taylorconterds.. phcnomeoology is a VttSion oftranscmdcntal argwnent. then
it does no more than -ronnulaae bowldary conditions.., or~ convmtionally. establish lhe
"preconditions" of experiencc:~.Yet if we accepl Hegel's claim that thought is not simply
the activity of the subject. then his phenomenological exposition must be more than an
attempt to establish. the a priori limits or conditions that apply to knowing. In other words.
Hegel's work is not trying to demonstrate "how" and '"why" various forms ofconstiousness-
"visions of experience" - to borrow Taylor's phrase. are possible or impossible. or that
ccnain ones are comparatively bener than others. Hegel. on the contrary. includes them all
within the more comprehensive category of Spirit or the "divine ldea-, In lhis sense.
therefore. he is not committed to discovering the ground and source of human experience
\\ithin subjective reason or individualsdr~ as Taylor implies when he insists
that Hegel is doing transcendental argwnent.
Hegel ~s h.is woR: in the PbcmDlCl¥lloyy Of Seirit as a -ladder" to actual
knowledge or the 'absolute standpoint'_That is to say. Hegel supposes that in completing the
insiglll into the logic of the series of phenomenal fonns outlined in the Pbmomc;D9logy of
.5.Jllril hc is bringing about a transition from the mere appearance of knowledge to actual
knowledge, Transcendental arguments, on the other hand. assume from lhe outset a
distinction between knowing and the world· Le, they assume that then: is always :1
distinction be(\o,'ccn lhe way things 1ft and the way they are 'for us", The sole function of
transcendental argwncnt. aceordingIy, is to establish the limits wb.ic:b pertain to knowing ""for
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us". and to that extent it is nol an actual knowledge of anything.
Transcendental arguments.. as we nave seen. are self-evident and indubitable because
they are
...grounded incur grasp of the point oraur activity, thai grasp
we must have to carry on the aetivity.17
In being so grounded we can be assured that what they explain about ourselves as subjects
is genuine. because 10 doubt is to doubt we are engaged in the activity of being aware. of
grasping something. and this is not possible in any coherent sense.JI
But at the same time Taylor also admits that ttanscendental arguments do not
foreclose questions aCme ontological status afthe object ofexperience. The real object of
an act of knowledge as distinguished from the epistemological object is accordingly
problematical. What things are in themselves is recognized by Taylor as being beyond the
scope of transcendental argument. But this. as we saw in the first chapter. is what Hegel is
critical of. precisely because such an argument never deals with the actual, conceplual
dynamic in things. In both the "Preface" and the "Introduction" to the Pbeoomeno!ogy of
SJlliiL. Hegel is clear that the heart of philosophical method, in his view, is not the pwely
subjective fonnulations that we fmd in philosophical propositions of the fonn "S is P", but
the concept or notion. Thus in a proper speculative judgement the predicate is not mcrc:ly
something which is asserted of the subject. but is meant to express the acruaI essence or
dynamic of the subject. In the judgement "the actual. is the universal", to repeat an earlier
example, the ""universal" is not something else which is predicaled of''the actual", but mther
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is meant to express the essence of"the actual". The real objects afknowledge.therefore. far
from being rOOied in the fonns of subjective consciousness. as Taylor suggests. are in
speculative philosophy the aclUal concepts or notions which animate things. Accordingly.
in speculative philosophy no distinction is made between lhinking. as something which is
ours. and an objective reality as something other. about which we make judgements. Yet
Taylor is insisting that Hegel's position can be shown to be nothing other than another fonn
of Kantian transcendental argument. which takes as basic to experience the polarization
bet\veen subject and object. This isa view which in the "Introduction" and "Preface" to the
phenomenQ!ogy of Spjrit Hegel rejects.
In this section I propose to examine Taylor's specific claims for considering the first
thret: chapters in the Phenomenology ofSpjrit as transcendental in fonn. Taylor's argument
has two parts: first. he argues that Hegel's work can be identified as transcendental in fonn
in that it has a common bent or affinity with other transcendental arguments; second, he
argues that Hegel's method as outlined in the "lnlroduction" 10 the PbcnomeooJogy ofSpjri'
is similar in Siructure to transcendental argument.
In his essay ··TheOpening Arguments ofThe Phenomenology"Taylor's initial reason
for considering the first three chapters of Hegel's Phengmenology gfSpjrit as an essay in
transcendental argumenl is the affinity be believes they bave with arguments of this kind.
Transcendental arguments ofthe Kantian variety have, according to Taylor, a cenain bent
in common. They are all, he alleges,
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...directed against one or other aspect aCme dualist picture of
experience developed and handed down to us by Cartesianism
and empiricism.lq
Both the empiricist and Cartesian traditions. in varying degrees. contends Taylor. understand
experience to consist of the .....passive reception of sense data. so that the nature of
experience itself is not bound up with the way we interact and deal wilh the world··.-lO It is
this view ofexperience that Taylor believes Hegel is taking aim at in the second chapter of
the PheoomenQlogy of Spirit. Why? Bei:ause this model of experience lacks a causal
dimension. As Taylor explains:
This view. as Hwne amply demonsuated. cannot help but
make causality problematical. For. as he eloquently argued.
there is no room within a contemplative account ofperception
for an impression of natural necessity. of"power''.~l
It is Taylor's view that Hegel's work represents a working out of. or a recovering of. this
phenomenal causality that in particular is absent in the empiricist tradition. Transcendental
arg.ument generally. and Kant's in particular. represents an attempt to refute or 10
demonstrate the implausibility of this empiricisl view and to establish our experience of
causality. in Taylor's judgment. to the extent that Hegel in his chapter on "Perception" is
attempting to refute the comemplative acCOUDt of perception. he is in the same company as
Kant and other transcendental philosophers. But whether Hegel's agenda is similar in this
res~1 is an issue that needs 10 be confronted. Besides, as Taylor himsclfpoints out;
... transcendental arguments are not identified by their bent but
by their structure as argument. and this is the palailel we have
to show to Hegel's work.42
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Although it is not integral to Taylor's argument. it is nevertheless debatable whether
it is Ihe case lhat lhe phenomenQlogy of Spiti!, like Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
represents an anempt to establish the implausibility or impossibility of Ihe notions of
experience represented by Cartesianism and empiricism. Nor is it clear why Taylor makes
this claim. because. as he later states. the dialectical movement that results when
consciousness realizes the inadequacy of its notion ofexperience
...is a real change and not simply a disappearance ofa model
thus sminen with a contradiction: for the contradiction
belWeen model and reality is a detenninate (bestimmt) one:1J
But the "disappearance ofa model" ofexperience does nOI imply thai it is refuted or sho....Tl
to be impossible. Roben Pippin rightly points out:
... Hegel is nOI trying to show that various candidate accounts
ofexperience are individually impossible...or comparatively
bener or worse than others.U
However [do nOI agree with Pippin that Hegel's interest is. to quote him again,
...a reconslNCtive account of the poss.ibility of experience
driven by the consciousness/self-consciousness problematic
and the objectivity issues thai it raises.~'
Pippin is correcl in asserting thai Hegel is trying to establish that the various fonns of
experience are nOI just ....subjective impositions, cuning us off from things in
themselves.. :'..lI> However, the various fonns ofconsciousness and the concepts that animate
them are not simply internal to any "subject's self-understanding" as Pippin also contends.
but are moments within the more comprehensive category of Spirit.. wruch in tum must be
seen as pan ofa larger whole wbichcomprises a logical and natural order of things as well.
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Phenomenology, as we saw in our examination oCme "Preface" and "Introduction"
to the PbenornenolQIlY ofSpjrit, in no way attempts to demonstrate that a given philosophical
slandpoim. be it Canesianism or empiricism. is literally wrong or false. That is to say. a
particular philosophical standpoint is never viewed as a false notion ofexperience. Hegel
stresses throughout the "Preface" to the phenomenolQgy o[Spirj, that the ..true" is the whole
or system and that each of its configurations is a necessary moment in the development of
science a such. It is for this reason., to quote Hegel. that:
...the length arthis path has to be endured. because. for one
thing. each moment is necessary; and further, eaelt moment
has to be lingered over. because each is itself a complete
individual shape, and one is only viewed in absolute
perspective when its determinateness is regarded as a concrete
whole. or the whole is regarded as uniquely qualified by that
dctennination.47
Additionally. the various philosophical outlooks that make up this path, whether
Canesianism. empiricism or some other philosoprucal system, represent for Hegel the
··...progressive unfolding of truth", and each contains, potentially, within itself the entire
series of concepts that constitute knowing or science.... At the very beginning of the
"Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel likens this emergence of science to the
development and fonnation ofa plan!. He states
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom. and
one might say that the fonner is refuted by the later; similarly,
when the fruit disappears, the blossom is shown up in its turn
as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now
emerges as the truth of it instead..Yet at the same time their
!1uid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in
which. they not only do not conflict., but in which each is as
62
necessary as the other...~~
Thus philosophical systems do indeed supersede or displace one another. but they are not
literally refuted. since each philosophical system is as necessary as any other to the
development of science. and what is true in anyone standpoint is preserved in subsequent
ones. The falsity of any particular standpoint does not imply thai: it is something over and
done with: otherwise the false would be one thing and the truth something other. To say.
therefore. that Cartesianism is false in some respect does not imply that it is something
annulled and finished. nor does it mean that it is a standpoint which is isolated from the truth.
Cartesianism. like all philosophical standpoints under examination in the PhenomenQlogy
2f..SWril, must be viewed as the whole bUth manifesting itself in one of its forms. The tact
that it becoml.'S unsatisfactory implies that it is in some manner irK:omplete or partial. not that
it is literally false or external to the truth,
Actual knowledge. as it is revealed in the entire progress ofhuman experience is. for
Hegel. not a separate realm from the ..truth". The dialectical movement intrinsic to
consciousness or thought does not. in this reading of Hegel. entail the refutation of any
particular philosophical standpoint In fae!, eaeh philosophical system. be it Canesianism.
empiricism or anyone of the countless others that have arisen within in the history of
philosophy. is the whole 'lruth" revealing itself in one of the .....shapes of Spirit. ..' noted
above. In the "Introduction" to the~ Hegel makes this point more directly.
Each of the pans of philosophy is a philosophical whole. a
circle rounded and complete in itsel[ In each of these pans.
however. the philosophical Idea is found in a particular
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specificality or medium...The Idea appears in each single
circle, but at the same time, the whole Idea is constiruted by
the system of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary
member of the organization.50
Thus Cartesianism may express this Idea more explicitly or comprehensively than
empiricism. or vice versa, but neither is literally false or wrong. In this regard. then. Hegel
is not anti-Cartesian or anti-Empiricist as Taylor suggests. Each part of philosoplly, whether
it is Cartesianism or Empiricism. is a necessary moment in the series of concepts that
constitutes what knowing is. The fact that one particular ronn Or phase oflhis philosopllical
whole bet:omes unsatisfactory, merely means the occasion for the developmem ofa new and
more comprenensive fonn of philosophical thought, incorporating the previous form within
it.
In tenns of organization or structure, then, how is the argument of the
PhenomenQIQgy of Spirit similar to transcendental argument? First. lei us briefly review
Taylor"s account of uanscendental argument given above. Transcendental argument is one
which, starling from some indubitable facet ofexperience and proceeding through a series
of indispensability claims, dnlws certain conclusions concerning the characteristics that the
initial indubitable facet of experience must have in order 10 be possible. Hegel's method.
therefore, ifuanscendental in nature, "'ill have to confonn to this structure ofargument
Hegel's procedure for carrying out his phenomenological exposition asswnes that
philosophy or science is an actual knowing, not, as he notes in the "Preface", just a 'love of
knowing·.sl But as actual knowing it must, as indicated previously, reveal itself in the entire
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sphere of human knowledge or experience. not merely in a set of first principles or a priori
conditions. understood as the conditions ofany possible knowledge whatever. For Hegel.
then. actual knowing or science cannot be limited to what is possible for human cognition;
otherwise we would have two kinds ofknowing; a fmite knowing, what is true for us, and
an absolute knowing, knowledge of what things are in themselves. But, as we previously
observed in our examination of Hegel's method, this is an assumption which. presupposes:
...that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the
other. independent and separate from it. and yet is something
real; or in other words, it presupposes the cognition which.
since it is excluded from the Absolute is surely outside aCthe
truth as weB. is nevertheless true....s,
Thai is to say. the presupposition being made by Kant and others is that there is finite.
empirical knowledge. but there is no knowledge of the Absolute or knowledge ofwhat things
are in themselves. Now for Hegel, like Kant. it is certainly the case that it is through reason
that we gain knowledge. but the object, for Hegel, is not simply there. independent ofour
thinking. in some noumenal realm for instance. Moreover. if the object is not ultimately
independent ofcognition. as Hegel suggests. then it is also the case for Hegel that we only
think the object when we abandon a purely subjtttive fonnulation of things. i.e. overcome
our own subjectivity. Taylor's claim. though. is that Hegel's work is an example of
transcendental argument, and allows with Kant that subjective arguments are incapable of
establishing anything about things as they are in themselves. They articulate something about
our life as subjects. that is , the world as we experience it, but it always is the case that our
o\'m self·awareness could be profoundly flawed. As Taylor observes:
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They prove something quite strong about the subject of
experience and the subject's place in the world; and yet since
they are grounded in the nature of experience. there remains
an ultimate. ontological question they can't foreclose· for
Kant that of the things in themselves... lJ
The view. therefore. of both Kant and Taylor is that transcendental argwnent or
transcendental philosophy is not an actual knowledge of anything except perhaps a
knowledge of what knowing for us is. or is not. In the Kantian philosophy, for instance.
concepts are understood in terms of their function injudgment. thai is to say. they are forms
of synthesis pertaining to the given phenomena of intuition, or they can be viewed as rules
for our unification of representations. In either case they are the subjective condition for the
possibility ofexperience. rather than a comprehension oClhe actual. dynamic structure of
things. So. while Taylor sees the distinction between appearances and things in themselves
as an unacceptable aspect of Kant's philosophy. tie nevertheless agrees with Kant on the
basic role oftranseendental argwnents. Specifically. tie holds that transcendental arguments
only express something about the nature ofltle subject's position in the world. rather than
articulating any kind of insight into the nature of the world itself. But Hegel's own
conviction. as' have been attempting to show, is that if knowledge is merely knowledge of
reason as such. or. to use Taylor's formulation, knowledge of'experience as such', then it
is not of much value.
Hegel's own view is expressed in the saying that thought or reason must have its
ground in reality, and. conversely nothing can be said to be, except that it is in some sense
known. The latter part of this expression is taken to mean that the real nature of things is
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brought to light in reflection. In the Hegelian system the objective world is not something
different from our thought of it. but something which is brought out in the thinking of it. In
the~ this is clearly affirmed:
The real nature of the object is brought to light in reflection;
but it is 00 less true that this exertion of thought is my act. If
this be so. the real nature is a product of my mind. in its
character of thinking subjecl...in one word. in my Freedom.~
h is also the case. nonetheless. that the object is oot~ a product of my mind. in the
sense that the categories of reason are not merely the forms of subjective consciousness.
Reason or thought. for Hegel. must be manifest in the actual world. This is not 10 ascribe.
as Hegel notes. consciousness to the things of nature, but to recognize that reason or 'nous'
governs the world.sS However. this means that these two aspects of thought must be in some
way reconciled or harmonized. Again as Hegel notes in the~:
...il may be held the higltest and final aim of philosophic
science to bring about...a reconciliation of the self-conscious
reason with the reason which is in the world ~ in other words.
withactuality.~
Thus Hegel's famous stalement that what is reasonable and what isaetual arc the one and the
same,S7 The reconciliation of self-conscious reason with the world. however. can only be
achieved. as we noted in Chapter One. by a subjectivity or self-conscious reason wltich
immerses itself in actual reality ( reason as it is in the world), and by the concomitant raising
of 'being' or the world out ofabsolute 'otherness",
Epistemologically speaking, what does this all imply? In the first instance it means the
discovery that reason is manifested in the world· the real.izatiOIl that reason is not fully actual
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unless it passes over into existence. or is made manifest in something objective. It is the
realization. for example. that nature is rational. that it is not. as it is for Kant, merely .....so
many representations aCthe mind"SI, As Hegel notes it in the Philosophy of Mind: "External
Nature. too. like mind. is rational. divine. a representation of the Idea."l9 Secondly, and
subjectively speaking, it means that the object is not merely something 'other' about wllien
we think. but is explicitly an object which is as much subject as it is an object. Thus. knowing,
contra Taylor. is that activity where the polarization between subject and object is
surmounted. This process ofovercoming the distinction between consciousness and its object
first comes to light in the Pbenomenology ofSpjrit in the transition from "Consciousness" to
"Self-Consciousness", and tinally concludes when consciousness has traversed the entire
r.mge ofphenomenological standpoints. Only thend~ absolute knowing come to know what
it is, an actual philosophical knowing.
It is this reconciliation or integration of the spiritual. life of man with Ihe outward
reality of nature and history that Hegel works OUt in the Phenomenology of Spirit. But as he
proposes in the "Preface" and "introduction" to the Phenomenology Of Spjrit, and as be
exhibits in the body of that text. this can only come about as an examination ofconsciousness
by itself. This self-critical movement of thought - "experience"· is the
...dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on
itself and which affects bolh its knowledge and its objcct...60
Thus. through this dialectical movement in which consciousness realizes that its own
distinction from a world existing independent of it is not an absolute distinction, both
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knowledge and object are affected. Nature, as we noted above, is no longer a mere object,
independent and opposed to self-conscious reason. but is understood to be rational as well-
i.e. a represenl8tion oflhe Idea.
II is litis dialectical movement ofconsciousness that Taylor claims is transcendental
in structure and which. he claims. Hegel employs in his rejection of the mindlbody dualism
of Descartes and the Kantian "Ding·an-sich". In other words, Taylor thinks Hegel presupposes
and seeks to overcome dualism. But it is my position that Hegel is not attempting 10 do this
because his standpoint does not rest on an absolute distinction between subject and object.
Nor is it the case. as Taylor suggests. thai Hegel is anempting to overcome lhis dualism by
showing thai all our experience or consciousness of things is built on some original
engagement with the world.f>l Hegel's point in the Phenomenolggy o(Spjd, is that there is no
.original' engagement. just as there is no 'original' or"transcendental' standpoint which
conditions our consciousness of things. Science or absolute knowing comes to know what it
is through its own phenomenological development, which is not a critical inquiry into the
nature of what knowledge is "'for us", since such an inquiry assumes what it seeks to
overcome. specifically the polarization between the inquirer and the object of his inquiry.
Thus the claim thai our consciousness of things, 10 quote Taylor, ••..can only be understood
by reference to a prior handling ofor engagement with the world" does not overcome the
initial division between our knowing and what is known/'2 for this claim rests on a subject-
object distinction as well, in that knowledge or experience is still nothing but a dimension
of human self-consciousness itself. That is to say, the claim. that our consciousness of things
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is nOI primordially receptive. but built on a more original engagement with things, is still one
which springs from the nature ofhwnan subjectivity itself. and nol from the nature of things.
That Hegel does not, in my view, see knowledge as standing or falling on such
possibilities. does nOI also imply that Hegel understands experience. qua finite subjects, as
not being engaged in the world. On the contrary, 10 quote Hegel at length:
Mind is not an inert being but., on the contrary. absolutely
restless being, pure activity. the negating or ideality of every
fixed catcgory of the abstmct.ive intellect; not abstractly simple
but. in its simplicity, at the same time a distinguishing of itself
from itself; not an essence that is already finished and
complete before its manifestation, keeping itself aloof betund
its host of appearances, but an essence which is lrUly actual
only through the specific Conns of its necessary self·
manifestation; and it is not...a soul·thing only externally
connected with the body, hut is inwardly bound to the latter by
the unity of the Notion.6J
I take lhis to mean that 'consciousness'. ·will'. 'religion'. 'morality', etc.• all those activities
which signify for Hegel spirit· are very much "in the world", Thus. knowledge. our
consciousness of things. is not characterized by reason as it is laid down. a priori, in a set of
principles, but as it is actually manifest in the entire range of human affairs and experience.
It would seem that, for Hegel.1be whole consciousnesslself<onsciousness framework
is flawed. That is 10 say. the principle ofviewing all consciousness ofobjects as presupposing
self-consciousness in the fonn of the "I think" or "transcendental unity ofapperception" is
l1awed. Why? Because such a principle views aU thought or reason as entirely subjective, that
is. as ours and ours alone. 1be upshot of this is that reason as it is manifested in the actual
world and conscious life is igoored., and is instead confined, in the manner of Kant. 10 a
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variety of first principles aCknowledge and action. But a dialectic ofconsciousness on this
view ofreason strictly focuses on our thinking alone. In other words, the dialectical movement
ofconsciousness is merely about a "knowing subject who has a cenain vision of things". to
borrow Taylor"s phrase. and not also about ID1iU is though1.w Taylor sees Hegel's
pbeoornenology of Spirit as an essay in lransCendental argument because he holds with Kant
that reason is to be identified with or growJded in pure self-consciousness· the .., think". One
begins with some basic feature ofour experience. some fundam~tal starting point such as the
.., think" or the "existential'" subject. as Taylor notes, and then one demonstrates it to be
impossible unless some other feature is posited with it. This is done until the whole system
of necessary conditions ofexperience is worked OUL, or alternatively. as Taylor states. to again
"enmesh" oneselrin another set ofproblems, more rewarding 10 explore.6l This would suggest
a kind of endless investigation or exploration of human experience, where Hegel's goal of
reconciling or harmonizing self-conscious reason with the reason that is in the world is
ignored. ignored because ttanseendentaJ arguments only say something about the nature ofour
own self·awareness and self·activity and nothing about the way in which reason is actually
manifested in the world. This stands in stark contrast to Hegel's own view:
Pure self·recognition in absolute otherness, this Aethcr as
such. is the ground and soil of Science or knowledge in
general The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires
that consciousness should dwell in this element.66
In other words. subjective consciousness must immerse itself in "absolute otherness" or
objective reality in order to raise this "absolute otherness" out of isolation. This will also
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require that self-consciousness give up the ideal ofsening itself up as a wholly independent
and truncated ego whose sole concern is the a priori conditions aCknowledge and action.
Yel this is a demand that Taylor ignores when he characterizes Hegel's work as
tmnseendenlal in Conn. The various arguments in the PhenomenQlogy o(Spjril all presuppose.
in Taylor's reading ofthem. the Kantian ~I think", Everything that occurs in experience· whal
is gi·...en a posteriori. is conditioned. a priori. by this subjectivity. Consciousness. in other
words. is constrained by a prior set of transcendental conditions. wllich is averse to any
mediation by thought. For Taylor. accordingly. the various fonns of finite consciousness
either fulfill or fail to fulfill these conditions. and those that fail to satisfy these prerequisites
are shown to be an unacceptable conception ofexperience. Consciousness, on this view of it.
is lixcd and is not inherently dialectical in the Hegelian sense. where both consciousness and
its object actually undergo cnange.
Taylor's analysis of the PhenoweMloRY of Spirit begins with an examination of
Hegel"s method· i.e. Hegel's notion of the dia.lettical movement inherent in consciousness.
Hegel's goal is in this regard. in Taylor's view. to ••...show that 'consciousness' is ultimately
one ....ith ·self-consciousness·~.61Hegel's method. as Taylor understands it:
...will be to start with ordinary, "natural~ consciousness and
show that on examination it transfonns itself into another
"figure" (Gestaltu"g)."*
But how can ordinary consciousness "U'ansfonn itself into another 'figure' '''1 Because for
Hegel. states Taylor. ~ ...natural consciousness...comes to see its own untruth or
inadequacy-.~We need to note, however, that for Taylor a 'iigure" of consciousness means
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a consciousness which is ". shaped by a certain idea of what experience is''.lO Additionally,
this notion of experience. 10 quole Taylor again. is .....that of a knowing subject who has a
certain vision ofthings".71 Now what Taylor means by the "untruth.. or "inadequacy" of
consciousness seems to have 10 do with the erroneous or false nature of the notion of
experience adopted by ordinary consciousness. But this is a view ofconsciousness. as noted
previously. which Hegel does not hold. Consciousness is never literally false. It may be
incomplete. partial. one-sided. but it always carries within itself· i.e. within its "iigure" • a
conception ofwhat knowing is. Yet it is precisely because it is manifest in one panicular (onn
cr"figure" that it is the occasion for its becoming unsatisfactory or ineffective, to use Taylor's
tenninology. As Hegel states:
Consciousness...is explicitly the Notion of itselr. Hence it is
something that goes beyond limits. and since these limits are
its 0....11. it is something that goes beyond itself. With the
positing ofa single panicu.lar the beyond is also established for
consciousness. even if it is only alongside the limited object as
in the case ofspatial intuition.T.!
In other words. me very fact that consciousness affirms a panicu.lar idea of what knowing is,
involves for it a beyond. or something further. as well. It does not, therefore. have to be
literally a false or wrong notion of experience. as Taylor implies. in order to involve
transition. movement. and development.
But the specific question which Taylor considers is: how can consciousness come to
see its own inadequacy? Oranalogously, how can consciousness transfonn itselffrom within?
This will involve giving an acCOlDlt ofthe dynamic, self-moving character ofconsciousness.
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More importantly. for Taylor. such an account will have to demonstrate why this dialectical
movement intrinsic to consciousness is transcendental in structure. For the purposes of this
paper I take the dialectical movement of consciousness to be the self-eritica1 movement of
consciousness in so far as its objects fail to accord with its concepts. And in its attempt to
cling to these oppositions. new, more comprehensive fonns of consciousness and knowing
emerge. Except. for Hegel, this process is not the mere striving after knowledge but is its
actual accomplishment. Le. science or philosophy.
Now Taylor accepts this dialectical movement as integral to the development of
consciousness. but he construes it strictly in lenns oCtile contradiction that arises between a
model ofexperience· understood as a knowing subject with a certain vision ofexperience·
and thai model as it "effectively" is, that is to say, as a model ofexperience that consciousness
attempts to realize. In other words. for Taylor all thought is something which is ours and only
ours. simply a panicular outlook on the world. and we can never be certain whether we are
not in some important way deceived.
For Taylor. ordinary. "natural.. consciousness. as I noted above. understands
experience as comprised of .....a knowing subject who has a certain vision of things......n
Thus. any notion ofexperience that consciousness possesses is determined by what it takes
to be experienced: "sense-data"...particular data", etc.. But ordinary consciousness cannot
come to see the inadequacy ofany particular notion ofexperience by judging that "vision of
things" by something .....effectively there in the wodd".1~ Why? Because. explains Taylor. this
would be introducing a "yardstick" external to the panicular model ofexperience affinned by
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the knowing subject. Additionally, this procedure would be superfluous because "experience
is not just a function of what is there in the world to be experienced".*rhis is not an
unexpected statement given Taylor's claim that all transeendenlal arguments must appeal as
bedrock to the .., think" as a basic facet of experience. In other words. ordinary
consciousness's experience afme world is nothing other than a dimension ora "knowing
subject" - Le. self-conscious reason itself.
But this notion ofexperience is not one that Hegel employs in the Phenomenology of
SWri1. Hegel does not. when discussing consciousness or knowing in the "Introduction" to the
PhenomenQ!ogy o(Spjrit, employ notions such as "knowing subject", "cognition", "objective"
and "subject'". precisely because their meaning is not yet established. As he states early in the
"Introduction";
...to give the impression that their meaning is generally well
known. or thai their Notion is comprehended. looks more like
an anempt to avoid the main problem, which is precisely to
provide this Notion.76
To employ certain ideas such as "subject" and "object", etc., as iftheir meaning ....'ere familiar,
is to presuppose a certain view ofexperience even before its nature has been fuBy explored.
[n other words. if we set down in advance what these notions of cognition are, then we
prejudice our inquiry from the very start. Thus, one of the reasons for doing a phenomenology
of spirit is to disclose the meaning of these tenns in a systematic fashion, and not to
presuppose their meaning in advance. Yet this injunction, not to make any preliminary
asswnption about experience, is one which Taylor does not heed in his analysis of Hegel's
7S
work. Taylor assumes that experience is ofa cenain, definite character.
Our ordinary notion ofexperience is that ofa knowing subject
who has a certain vision of things; the notion ofexperience is
characterized by the notion we have of what is experienced,
sense-data (sensible qualities), particulate data ( fields ). and
soon.n
He presumes that the primary clement in experience is the "knowing subject who has a
certain vision of things". That is to say. for Taylor it is our subjectivity, or consciousness
alone. which is the essential feature in our experience of the things - Le. our own
consciousness is an essential and inescapable fact or our existence. For Hegel this is nOI an
assumption which can be justified at the begiMing of any inquiry into the nature of
knowledge. The beginning ofany inquiry, in orner words. must be presuppositionless.
In Taylor's commentary on the first three chapters ofthe PhenomenQ1QRYQfSpjrib the
essential feature ofexperience. then, is the "knowing subject", the "I", who embraces a certain
"vision of things". Experience, accordingly, is conceived as exclusively a function of the
··knowing subject'", and being so, transcendental arguments only make claims concerning the
nature of that experience. qua subjective. So conceived. the distinction between an "I" which
does the thinking and an objective reality as the correlate of the "[" again emers the picture.
For Hegel this division represents the standpoint of finite consciousness.. even though this
standpoint idealizes external nature or the object which. stands opposed 10 it. Finite
consciousness is characterized by the experience of itself as an autonomous and indifferent
ego to which things arc referred; a consciousness that does not yet realize or comprehend its
unity with its other. But this is oot the spirit's fmal repose, as Hegel repeatedly notes in the
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"Introduction" to the PhjloSOphy ofMjnd:
...mind is nOI satisfied. as finite mind. with transposing things
by its own ideational activity mto its own imerior space and
thus stripping them of their ex.ternality in a manner which is
still external; on the contrary...as philosophical thinking, it
consummates this idealization of things by discerning the
specific mode in which the etemalldea fonning their common
principle is represented in them. tI
In other words. for Hegel. consciousness eventually realizes, as 'philosophical thinking' or
.absolute knowing'. that its own distinction from an indifferent world existing independent
of it. is acruaJly no distinction. But this transition from the mere appearance of knowledge to
"uclUal knowledge" is one that. in Taylor's view of Hegel's Phenomeno!Qgy ofSpjrit, is not
effected. While I agree with Taylor that for Hegel our consciousness of things is not
l:ssentially receptive, but is characterized by some type of engagement with them, this, for
Taylor. merely demonstrates what our experience as subjects must be • i.e. "originally"
engaged with things. For Taylor, transcendental argwnent does not and cannot attempt to
discover whether this is actually so or not, for it asswnes from the outset a subject-Qbject
distinction which excludes that possibility. For Hegel this would mean that we have
"experience" but not "science" or "actual knowledge". Transcendental argument,
accordingly. is not an actual knowledge ofanything, but an attempt to furnish a rationale for
panicular kinds of experiences.
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Chapter Three
Sense Cenainty: Transcendenlal Argument
or Phenomenological Exposition?
In this chapter 1propose to examine Taylor's specitic claim that the first section of
Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpjril ·"Sense-Certainty". is transcendental in fonn. Iwill suggest
why this interpretation is inappropriate. given Hegel's own view of phenomenology as
outlined in the "Introduction" and -Preface" to the Phenomenology o(Spjril, Additionally,
1 will olTer an alternative reading of the chapter on ~sense-certainty". one that I think is
guided by Hcgel"s own conception of phenomenology. If. as I have argued. Hegel's goal in
the Phc:nomeoology QfSpjdt is the self-education ofknowing by way ora tracing ofthe logic
afthe various finile forms ofabsolule knowledge. then "sense-certainty" must ~ seen as part
of this development. That is to say. "sense-certainty" must be understood as a moment Of
element in this dynamic and fonnative process. and nolo as Taylor suggests. a model of
~xperience which does not effectively fulfill some underlying standard. taken to be an
undeniable facet ofour experience. My argument is that the chapcer entitled "sense-cenainty"
cannot be given a transcendental fonn, that this reading is inappropriate, given Hegel's
criticisms oftranseendental method and his stated goal of disclosing how the various finite
fonns of consciousness represent the self-education of absolute spirit to knowledge of its
QI,\ITI spiritual principles.
Transcendental arguments, as Taylor deflllCs them, are ones that start from some
putatively Wldeniable facet ofexperience and by regressive argwnent articulate the necessary
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conditions of this experience. In other words. transcendental argument reasons back from
what experience is like to what the fonn of the subject must be if this experience is to be
possible. (n each case. transcendental argument presupposes that we can identify certain
basic and pervasive features of experience which are beyond cavil. Taylor holds that the
opening movements in the Phenomenology of Spirit like transcendental argument.
presuppose certain undeniable fearures ofexperience. In Taylor's judgment., the dialectic of
consciousness narrated in the opening sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit, like
transcendental argument.
... presupposes that we can characterize effective experience
in tenns independent of the model of experience we are
working with. Moreover. ifwe are to show that lhe model is
nOljust unrealized in a given case, but cannot be realized, we
have to be able to identify some basic and pervasive facets of
experience independently of our model ( they must be
independent. i.e. llOt derivable from the model itself. if they
are to contradict it and show it 10 be impossible ).1
In other words. the impossibilily or inadequacy ofa particuJar model of experience can only
be shown if it is in contradiction with certain presupposed and undeniable characteristics of
~xperience.
For Taylor, the whole dialectical movement of consciousness narrated in the first
three chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit depends on such undeniable starting points.
or what in an earlier work he calls "criteria! propertics,,2. Criteria! properties are basic
notions of what a standard or purpose must be, and are properties or characteriSlics which
are already met or established. Taylor uses an example from Plato's~ to indicate
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what he means here. He argues that the various conceptions ofjustice put forward in the
~ can only be shown to be inadequate because certain criterial properties ofjustice
are already known.J Cephalos' definition ofjustice, telling the truth and paying one's debts.
Taylor explains. is shown 10 be inadequate because cenain criteria! properties ofjustice are
already known; specifically, that a JUSt act is a good act. In the case of transcendentaJ
argument, which anempts 10 define the structure of the subject. granted certain types of
experiences. criteria! properties are those undeniable features of experience which are
essential and integral to our lives as knowing subjects. (n ·'sense-certainty". for example. the
criterial property is 'to know is to be able to say', Hence. ifwe have knowledge aflhis type.
then we should be able 'to say' what it is we know. He writes:
For us. knowing is inseparably bound up with being able to
say. even if we can only say rather badly and
inadequately...An experience about which nolhing at all could
be said...would be below the threshold of the level of
awareness which we consider essential for knowledge.~
The principle that conscious experience must be sayable or that knowing is bound up
wilh being able 10 say is. then, a criterial property which is brought to bear on "sense·
cenainty", For Taylor. the whole dialectic of"sense-certainty" presupposes this fundamental
and pervasive feature ofexperience, Without it the inadequacy of"sense-certainty" cannot
be demonstrated and another notion ofexperience cannot be introduced.
For Taylor, to be more specific, this dialectical movement can be best understood as
...3 relation involving not just two terms but three: the basic
purpose or standard, the inadequate reality, and an inadequate
conception of the purpose which is bound up with that
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reality.'
He goes on to explain more fully:
We start off with an inadequate notion of the standard
involved. But we also have from the beginning some very
basic. correct notions ofwhat the standard or purpose is. some
criterial properties which it must meet. It is these criterial
properties which in fact enable us to show that a given
conception of the standard is inadequate. For we show lhat
this conception cannot be realized in such a way as to meet
the criteria! properties. and hence that this definition is
unacceptable as a definition of the standard or purpose
concerned. But we show the inadequacy of the faulty Cannula
by trying to 'realize' it, that is. construct a reality according to
il. This is what brings out the conflict with the standard.&
(f the standard we are aiming at is knowing or science. then the given conception of the
standard would be a cenain concept of knowing considered as a realized standard. In the
opening section nfthe Pbenomeoo!ogyo[Spjrit this given conception oCtile standard would
be the affinnation on the part of"sense-cenainty" to be a knowledge of the immediate or of
what simply is. We can, Taylor argues, show that "sense-cenainty"is an inadequate
conc~ption of knowing or science because we are also from the beginning in possession of
a c~nain crileria! property of knowing, namely ·to know is 10 be able to say'. But, as Taylor
indicates. '"sense-certainty" can only be shown to be a faulty conception of knowing in our
attempt 10 realize it, to have this type of knowledge.
"Sense-cenainty"', then. and consciousness generally, can only be in contradiction
with itself if there are already certain standards or criterial properties of knowing thai are
already eSlablished. Taylor indicates that while this may seem to be imponing ideas and
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theories from outside ordinary consciousness, this is not the case. CriteriaJ properties, he
contends. do not violate Hegel's method because they are implicit in our way of knowing.
[n other words. criteria! properties are not considered outside of ordinary or finite
consciousness because they apply to us as knowing subjects. In requiring the subject of
"sense-eertainty" to say what he knows. argues Taylor. we are oot violating Hegel's method
because' ..implicit in knowing in the sense relevant ncre is a certain awareness of what is
Robert C. Solomon. in his book In the Spirit oCHere!, argues that Taylor does indeed
employ an external criterion when he insists that "sense-certainty" say what it knows.
Solomon states:
It is argued that Hegel's attack on sense-certainty is
essentially based on the fact that~ty cannot or will
not say anything, and knowledge requires something to be
said. But iflhis wen: Hegel's argument...il would be clearly
ineffectual. and it wouJd do what Hegel always insists that we
must not do. namely. apply a criterion to a fonn of
consciousness whicb is not already "intemal" to it. which it
does nOI itselfaccep1.'
[n any case. the requiremenl that we say what: il is we know would be ineffectual. in
Solomon's view. because "sense<ertainty" could make its case by just "shutting up".~
Solomon's contention that Taylor is importing an external crilerion into "sense-cenainty",
however. stems from his characterization of"sense-certainty" as a theory of knowledge and
not. as it is for Taylor. an actual attempt to experience in a certain manner. Thus of"sense-
certainty" Solomon states:
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It is important to stress that this is a view afknowledge rather than an
actual fonn ofconscioUSlleSS in the sense that we will encounter later.
that is. a realizable mode of living, a set ofconcepts that structure our
dailyexperience.1o
Solomon. nonetheless. does allow that, in some instances. a fonn ofconsciousness.
as a theory afknowledge. can include an attempt to 'live' that theory. I I In spite ofthis caveat..
however. Solomon insists that ;;;sense<ertainty" is not, and can never be, an actual endeavor
to experience in a certain way.12 "Sense-certainty". in other words. is a view aCknowledge
and not the content ofeveryday cognition. Now Solomon's reason for holding this view is
his belief lhal. for Hegel. there cannot be any immediate knowledge ofpaniculars: there
cannot be any knowledge unmediated by concepts. "Sense-cenaimy", therefore. as a form
of consciousness which is supposed to be in immediate contact with objects. is ruled out
from the outset. though, for Solomon. this is a claim which must be demonstrated. not just
atlirmed. 'l N\;:vertheless, Solomon's central point is that we are applying an external criterion
to "sense-certainty" when we insist that it 'say' what it knows, especially given thai it is a
Ihl:ory of knowledge which holds that knowledge does not require general descriptions.
Now. for Solomon, the argument in "sense-certainty" is a "contextualist" one, that
the identification and re-identification of particulars presupposes a context. He writes:
... the designation of particulars presupposes a context in
which reference (whether by pointing, grunting, saying "'this,"
or providing some more elaborate phrase,-e.g. '1he man in
the white suit'") is defined.H
Later he adds:
8)
This argument against the possibility ofidentifying particulars
has nothing to do with the demand that one must be able 10
say what it is one knows.. Jt has to do with the use of
universals at the very basis of experience, as a necessary
condition for our being able to pick out particular objects. It
has nothing to do as Taylor says, with "having to say
something just to get started..... "
The breakdown of"sense-<:enainty" for Solomon., then, has more do with its inadequacy as
a theory of knowledge rather than a failure of an actual model ofexperience which results
ITom an attempt to say what one knows.
While I agree with Solomon that "sense-certainty" resembles certain complex
theories of knowledge. there i~ no doubt that for Hegel "sense..certainty". as Taylor also
suggests. is a form of phenomenal or ordinary consciousness. At the end of his
·'Introduction". to give onc example, Hegel states:
The experience of itself which consciousness goes through
can. in accordance with its Notion. comprehend nothing less
than the entire system ofconsciousness., or the entire realm of
the truth of Spirit. For this reason. the moments of this mnh
are exhibited in their own proper detenninateness. viz. as
being not abstract moments. but as they are for consciousness,
or as consciousness itself stands forth in its relation to them.
Thus the moments of the whole are patterns of
consciousness l6
The patterns ofconsciousness, to use Hegel's wording, are those extant fonos of fmite
cognition or points of view of human subjective consciousness exhibited in the
Phenomenology of Spjdt. if, as Hegel observes in his Hlntroduction". consciousness
simultaneously distinguishes itself from something and at the same moment relates itself to
it. 11 then ordinary finite consciousness represents the cognitive relationship ofa subject to
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an object. If lhis is indeed the case, then "scnse-cenainty" is a fonn of finite or ordinary
consciousness. not simply a theory aCknowledge. However. while I agree with Taylor that
"sense-certainty" is not simply a theory aCknowledge. his use ofcriterial properties can still
be considered as violating Hegel's method. although for a different reason than that
specified by Solomon.
"Sense-certainty", then. is the reflection of the everyday, naive affirmation of the
immediately given world. and not strictly a theory aCknowledge. as Solomon suggests. In
this regard. Hegel's basic contention is that the development ofconsciousness from one stage
to the next must be one dictated by the subject matter itself. by the panicular concept of
knowing being embodied in "se~rtainty" itself. The transition from "sense-certainty"
to ·'\Xrception". for example, must result from an immanent necessity and not from the prior
demands of our subjectivity itself. Hans-Georg Gadamer. in Hegel's Djalectic, makes the
same observation concerning the development played out in the Phenomenology Q(Spjril:
...the advance &om one thought to lhc next. from one form of
knowing to the next, must derive from an inunanent
necessity. II
Richard Norman. in Ilis work.. Hegel's Pbc:nomeoology· A PhjloSQnbjcalloQ'Oduction. makes
a more general, but similar observation.
Science must vindicate itself not by being measured against
some preconceived criterion, but through a descriptive
examination of its character as a specific phenomenon, &om
wllicll its validity will emerge. This is what Hegel understands
by a 'phenomenology,:9
In both quotes the sentiment is the same- the pbeoomeoological development &om ordinary
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to absolute consciousness cannot be such that its movement and outcome is detennined by
some preconceived criterion. Accordingly. 10 use Gadamer's example•
...in thinking the sense certainty which fills it, consciousness
can no longer believe itself to be thinking anything other than
a "'universal 'this,", and thus it must grant thaI what it meant
is a "universal." and that it pe:n:eives it as a "thing...2(1
What still needs to be established, however. is how this outcome, as Taylor construes it.
violates Hegel's method.
Taylor's criteria! propenies are preconceived criteria in that they impose. prior to our
knowledge ofanything, cenain restrictions on what can or cannot count as knowledge for us.
[n the case or"sense-cenainty" it is the requirement that we 'say' what it is we know. But
it is just this use of a preconceived criterion at the begiMing of an examination into the
nature aCknowledge which. in Hegel's view, is not justified. It is Hegel's conviction that
such epistemological presuppositions are not warranted, even though it would seem that if
we do not have recourse to some underlying criterion at the beginning of the examination.
the examination cannot take place. Hegel's solution to this problem is one we have already
addressed in Chapter One. but what I want to emphasize here is his refusal to employ. wtIike
Taylor. any presuppositions at the beginning of his examination. In his "Introduction" to the
Phenomenology ofSpjri, he writes:
If this exposition is viewed as a way of relating Science to
phenomenal knowledge. and as an investigation.. jt would
seem that it cannot take place without some presupposition
which can serve as its underlying criterion. For an
examination consists in applying an accepted standard. and in
determining whether something is right or wrong on the basis
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of the resulting agreement or disagrttrnenl of the lhing
examinc:d; thus the standard as such (arxl. Science likewise if
it were the criterion) is accepted as the rJRnc~ or as the in-
itSft/f. But here, where Science bas just begun to come on the:
scme. neither Science nor anything else has yd justified itself
as the essence aCtbe in-ilSelr.... :I
Thus. a presupposition such as the criterial property 'to know is to be able to say' has 001
justified itself for use at the beginning ofan inquiry into the nature aCknowledge, and cannot.
therefore. serve as an underlying criterion or standard. Now while Taylor might argue thai
a criteria! property is nol an actual definition aCknowledge. but a preconceived standard of
knowing which must be satisfied. it is. nevenheless. a presupposition about what can or
cannot count as knowledge ''for us", Not only does such a prior restriction on what can count
as kno","ing prejudice the entire investigation but. concomitantly. il also implies thai
knowing is strictly what it is -Cor us", which then creates a distinction between our thinking.
as something ours and entirely ours. and an objecth-e reality as something other. about which
we think.
There seems 10 be a kind of epistemological bias or pmlisposition, in Taylor's
reading of Hegel's work. for regarding knowledge as sbict.ly a dimension of the human
subject. In this regard. it is not at all clear thai Hegel would accept the use of criteria!
properties of knowing, given that they are detenninations which apply to us strictly as
subjects. The use ofcriteria! properties presupposes that our cognition is a kind of medium
through which what we know is refiacted. In the caseof"~ty"'. for instance. what
is to be known is refracted or shaped by the necessity that knowledge for us be ·sayable·.
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Moreover. the usc of criteria! properties would imply an original distinction, and
concomiunI.ly a division between what is "for us" and what is "'in itself'. But. as I have
argued in Chapters One and Two. this is just the view aCknowledge which Hegel disavows
from the outset. The whole impul.se or inclination 10 view knowledge strietJy in terms of the
demands of the knowing subject is one Hegel sees as wuenable. in that it assumes a
distinction between knowing and what is known, which., on<::e accepted. can never be
Hegel's phenomenological exposition of "sense-eenaimy" makes no such
presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. 1l\ll1 is 10 say. it does not suppose. as
Taylor does. that conscious experience is .....that of a knowing subject who has a cenain
vision of things-.n Nor docs it make any presuppositions about the structure of that
experience. qua subject, for example. that it is ~...inseparably bound up with being able to
say...-Y Richard Norman makes the following comparable observation concerning the
exposition of the Pbcool1¥'OQlpgy of Spirit:
The: wort is wrinen as a sort or 'biography' ofConsciousncss.
a narTative 3CCOWlt of the various experiences which
Consciousness undergoes. Where olhcr philosophers ( the
Empiricists. or Kant. or contemporary British philosophers )
tend to speak of what we say, what we know. what we
experience. Hegel talks ofwbat c:oruciOUSfleSS experiences or
recognizes or discovers. 24
If the Phenomenology o[Spjril is not a depiction of""what we say. what we know, what we
experience", then it is not strictly about our thinking. Gadamer makes the following
commensurate assessment of Hegel's wotk.:
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Dialectic for Hegel is not ofour thinking alone. but rather...cf
what is thought, afme concept itself.lJ
This would suggest. contra Taylor. that the dialectical movement that consciousness
undergoes is not about the contradiction between apanicular model ofexperience. construed
as a knowing subject who has a certain vision ofthings, and a particular standard. understood
as a certain criterial property or undeniable facet of experience. Consciousness is
transformed from within. not because cenain models of experience are in conflict with
presupposed standards of knowing, but because each fonn of finite consciousness is
characterized by a disparity between its concept and its reality, that is to say. between what
"it is" and what is "ror it", The dialectical movement ofconsciousness. in other words. is a
result of this immanent self-eonilict.
Taylor's account of the movement and denouement of'·sense-certainty". as already
indicated. holds thai it is dependent upon some original or wx:Ierlying principle or standard.
viz. ··.. .if this is really knowledge. then one must be able to say what it is...... :!(> "Sense-
certainlY" can only be shown to be wrong or inadequate if this principle. or criterial property
of knowing. can be identified from the start. And it can only be identified from the start
because it is understood as an undeniable feature of ourselves as knowing subjects.
independenl of any model ofexperience under examination. But this requires that knowing
be understood as nothing else but a featUre of the hwnan subject itself. It is only in this way
that Taylor can claim that he is not violating Hegel's method when he treats the ability to say
as a criterial property of knowing. But if. as ( have argued in Chapter One, knowing for
8"
Hegel consists orooth subjectivity and objectivity and the relationship between them. then
it is difficult 10 see how Taylor is nol violating Hegel's method when he construes knowing
entirely in terms of the subject. "'Sense-certainty", then., as a knowing subject who has a
certain vision of the world. is merely a subjective standpoint to which certain criteria or
limits apply a priori.
Taylor's approach to Chapter One of the PbengmeoQlogy ofSpjrit is. then. to frame
the argument in tenns of the demand that "'sense-eertaintyr say what it knows. "Sense-
certainty" claims to be the -richest" kind of knowledge. because it is in immediate contact
with its object. prior 10 any conceptual activity. Hegel's strategy in the face afthis claim.
argues Taylor. is 10 take up the position of"sense..cenainty" and - ...try to say what we know
in this way··.~1 The altempt "to say". contends Taylor, .....will contradict the basic
requirements of scnsible certainty..... and" .will take us beyond its defining limits...·•.21 Only
in this way. maintains Taylor. can "scnse-certainty" stand sclf-refuted in the way Hegel
outlines in the "Introduction" to the PbenmneDQlogy QfSpjril.
Taylor indicates {wo main ways in which the attempt "'to say" will take "sense-
certainty" beyond its limits. The minor way is its lack of selectivity in its attempt to grasp
things, and the major way is its inability to pick out particulars without the mediating
instruments of universal concepts. The fltSt attempt, according to Taylor, centers on the claim
"sense-ccrtainty" makes to be the richest and the most inexhaustible kind of knowledge. But
when "sense-certainty" is challenged to say what it really is aware of. then the inexhaustible
richness of detail that it professes to possess is shown to be illusory. In its attempt to grasp
90
things, argues Taylor. "sense-eertainty" discovers that it lacks selectivity. The requirement
thaI we say what we know reveals that "scnse-eertainty" is not really in conlaCt wilh an
unlimited richness ofdetail. but rather only a certain selection. He explains:
looking al the objects in my sfUdy under their ordinary
descriptions as use objects (typeWTiteT, desk. chairs. etc. ), 1
cannol see them as pure shapes; or looking at them as pure
shapes. I cannot see them as the jW(taposition of different
materials. and so 00.29
But because ··sense~nty'· attempts to take in everything it lacks the selectivity required
to grasp panicu[ar things and is thus condemned to emptiness. to fall over into a "trancelike
starc".J.O
Now, earlier. Taylor stales:
An I:xperience about which nothing at all could be said. not
even that it was very difficult if not impossible to describe.
would be below the threshold of the level ofawareness which
we consider essential for knowledge.ll
Because "scnse-eenainty" is deficienl in this respect, lhe obvious implication is that it lacks
[hI: minimum level of awareness necessary for knowlt:dge. Thus Taylor takes this minor
argument to be a transcendental one. We start willt the putatively undeniable facet of
experience. thai to know. we must be able to say. and this allows us to demonstrate lite
illusory nature of the claim to be able to take in everything in an inexhaustible richest of
detail. But because language by its very nature is sel~ive. it also demonstrates that our
experience is necessarily mediated by the use ofconcepts.
The second way in which the attempt to say will take "sense-certainty" beyond its
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limits. argues Taylor. in'iolws a refutation of its claim to be in immediate contact with
sensible particulars. For Taylor this refutation ~ill involve rwo stages. In both stages the
challenge will be for -smse<ertainty" to say what it knows. In the tirst instance this will
involve -sense-ccrtainty" lll1SWtt1ng thechallengc: by use of-pUf'C demonstratives".)! In the
second instance the challenge will be answered with the use of"ostensive definition...D Each
attempt. however. fails to answer the challenge because the attempt at effective awareness
of the sensible particular can only be realized by employing universal terms or concepts.
rather than through the object'S own particularity. In the first instance. for example. the
demonstratives such as ''this'' or "here" or "now"'. because they can apply indifferently 10 a
variety ofcontexts, operate like universals. Similarly. the use ofostensive definitions is only
available in context. and lhis requ~ the use ofdescriptive Ierm5 such as -day", -night'",
-hour" and so on. But these art general terms which can never capture the particularity ofthe
object. And so. states Taylor•
...Hegel concludes. there is no unmediated knowledge of the
panicular. Sensible certainty ends up saying the opposite of
what it means. and this is the proof of its c:ontradictory
nature.u
Thus. by demonstrating the unsayability of the particular, araues Taylor, we also show that
it can only be grasped by the use of universal concepts, that is, by subsuming the particular
under Wliversal conc:epts.
Now the contradictory nature of"sense-certai.nty" can only be: demonstrated if we
first start from some undeniable c:haracteristic: ofexperienc:e, that is to say, if we first have
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certain preestablished criterial properties of knowing. The basic fonn of a transcendental
argument. as Robert Solomon points out, is,
(We) have an experience with (undeniable) characteristic u.
(We) could not have an experience with a unless (our)
consciousness had feature B.
Therefore. (our) consciousness has feature B.J'
(n the case of"sense~ertainty". then. the undeniable characteristic of experience is mat our
knowing is inseparably bound up with being able 10 say. The implication oflhis. however,
is that our experience or cognition must be ofa certain type - i.e. it necessarily involves the
mediating instrument ofuniversal concepts. Now, Hegel would not disagree with the view
that immediate knowledge of sensible particulars is impossible. But what he would object
to is Taylor's presentation oflhis idea as ifit were simply about our cognition. namely. that
it is a faculty of a certain kind and scope. whose nature and limits we need to define by
means of transcendental argument. To say that our conscious experience or cognition is a
raculty ofa definite kind and scope is to treat it as an instrument or medium Ihrough which
we get at the tnlth. But. as I have already indicated, it also introduces an original distinction
between ourselves and the~ world. which for Hegel. once established. can never be
sunnounted. )6
Trans.cendental argument. tribe above reading is accurate. can only work ifsubjective
consciousness is understood as a pure. autonomous self to which certain transcendental
criteria apply. a priori. Transcendental argument. accordingly, is directed to the conditions
of the possibility ofcognition or knowledge of this subjettivity. But a phenomeoological
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exposition aCthe experience ofconsciousness considers the actual dialectical movement in
consciousness itself. That is 10 say. it is entirely taken up with bow each of the various
phenomenal roons of human subjective consciousness actually give way to more
comprehensive ones, and how in this dialectical movement of the concept, qua subjective.
the system of science is constituted. In this sense, there is never any "undeniable" or
"permanent" feature ofexperience from which we can determine. a priori, the principles of
knowledge. Hegelian phenomenology, as I have already discussed. is an exposition of the
various forms of finite consciousness in teons aCthe concepts which animate them, and not
in terms of preestablished criterial properties or transcendental requirements of knowing. The
whole point of a phenomenological exposition is to demonstrate how the various Coons of
finite consciousness. which take themselves to be permanent and original. are really moments
or dements in knowledge as such.
A phenomenological exposition of"sense-certainty", therefore, will have to take up
the argument from within ';sense-<:ertainty" itself, exhibiting the logic of this fonn. and
demonstrating the necessity of ics advance to "perception". To cite Gadamer again:
...the dialectic which we spin out in reflection is only an
ancillary mediation perfonned on the natural presuppositions
ofconsciousness...l7
In other words, the dialectical progress of finite consciousness is not something externally
imposed by the phenomenologist, but derives from consciousness itself. But we do not have
to presuppose. as Taylor claims. some already accepted criterion by which to judge "sense·
certainty". we need only aaend to the logic of the inherent conflict within "sense..cenainty"
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itself. It is this inherent self-conflict which is the means whereby consciousness as "scnse-
certainty" recasts itself in a more complete form. But it is phenomenology which. in
reflecting on this process, demonstrates the necessity of the advance. and which in turn
ensures its completion as an actual knowing.
I now propose to take up Hegel's exposition of "sense-cenainty" and attempt to
follow the SlIUCture of the argument.. according to the method outlined in the "Introduction"
10 the PbeDQrnenQIQIA' o(Spjrit. My primary focus will be to show how the transition from
"sense-cenainty" to "perception" is the outcome ofconsciousness' own sclf-experience. This
will involve. as I have already indicated. showing how the transition 10 "perception" is a
result of an inherent self-conflict between what "sense-cenainty" is and what is for il. In
other words. it will entail showing how the contradiction within "sensc-«rtainty" is the
result of the disparity between its concept and its reality - not between a model ofexperience,
characterized by a knowing subject who has a certain vision ohhe world. and a presupposed
standard '10 know is to be able to say". All this is already implied in Hegel's understanding
of what consciousness is. namely, the relating to and distinguishing from an 'other', in which
the dctenninate aspect of this relating is "knowing". It thus belongs to consciousness that it
is always testing whether its concept corresponds to its object. and conversely whether its
object corresponds to its concept. But what is crucial for the present examination is that in
this testing both the measure of the truth and the knowing of it belong 10 consciousness. In
this dialectical movement. where both knowledge and object undergo cbange. what Hegel
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calls experience. no presuppositions about the nature of experience. independent of any
particular model or fonn ofexperience. need be made.
At the commencement o(his exposition Hegel states thaI our approach to the object
must be immediate or receptive. exactly as it is for -sense-cenainry". "In apprenending ie.
he goes on to explain. "we must refrain from trying to comprehend it".';' Thus Hegel lets us
know. from the outset, that he proposes to take up the argwnent from within -sensc-
cenainty" itself. This is as it should be. given his claim that phenomenology is lire dialectical
exposition of Ihe various ronns of finite consciousness in tenns of the concept of knowing
which animates each of them. Concomitantly this suggests thaI the movement or"sense-
cl:nainty" must spring from the intemallogical action oC"sense-certainly" itself - i.e. it must
derive from lhe disparity between what it is (its concept) and what is for it (its reality).
"5l::nse-cenainty··. or Qrdinary, naive consciousness, then, takes as the foundation of
our knowledge of the world that which is "given" to us immediately through the senses. In
other words. "sense-certainty'" is the view or ootion that we immediately apprehend the
"given" in its entirety without comprehending it. Or, otherwise put. it is the view the there
exists within consciousness as ~sense-«rtainty'" an identity between consciousness itselfand
its given object. Accordingly. the ~given" of "sense-cenainty" na.s being only in our
consciousness of it. and conversely there is only a registering consciousness where there is
a "given" to register. This is the essential point in "sense-certainty'". Sensuous consciousness..
as Hegel explains in the PbjlOSQphYQfMjnd
...is distinguished from the other modes ofconsciousness, not
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by the fact that in it alone the object is given 10 us by the
senses. but rather by the fact that on this stage the object,
whether an inner or an outer object, has no other thought.
detennination than first, that of simply being, and se<:ondly.
of being an independent Other over against me, something
reflected into itself. an individual confronting me as an
individual. an immcdiate.J9
Thus. "sense-certainty" is, firstly, immediate consciousness, and all that it can say of its
object is that it simply is. The object, for its part. is represented as something which is
immediate and individual or singular. Neither consciousness nor the object is anything other
than a pure "This", In "sense-certainty", as Hegel explains,
... neither I nor the thing has the significance of a complex
process of mediation; the 'I' does not have the significance of
a manilbld imagining or thinking; nor does the 'thing' signify
something that has a host ofqualities..IO
But whether this is the truth of~sensc-certainty" is something which will only come to light
in its development.
While there are recognizable empiricist themes in this section of the Pbenomenology
2f..Sl;UriI. as Taylor also acknowledges. such a theory is considerably more complex than
what is being exhibited in "sense-eertainty", namely, the naive affinnation of the
immediately Mgiven" world. The nature of this "given" is never explicated as it is in
empiricism, but merely affmned. There is, as previously indicated. no "complex process of
mediation" in such a standpoint but men:ly tbeapprehension ofwhat simply is. To say more
than this is to go beyond the immediacy or"sense-eertainty" to something else. namely some
kind of mediation. In "sense-eertainty", consciousness or the 'I', is not characterized by any
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imagining or thinking, it is simply a pure 'This', just as the object is pure 'This', Hegel
makes the following observation about how consciousness and its object must be construed
for "sense-certainty"':
...the -I' does not have the significance of a manifold
imagining or thinking: nor does the 'thing' signify something
that has a host ofqualities. On the contrary. the thing is, and
it is. merely because it is. 11 is; this is the essential point for
sense-knowledge. and this pure being, or this simple
immediacy. constitutes its truth. Similarly, certainty as a
connection is an immediale pure connection; consciousness is
.... nothing more, a pure ·This· ...~l
What a phenomenological exposition of ~sense-eertainty"must consider is how this
particular consciousness. in relating 10 and distinguishing itself from an other, is. through its
O\Vt1 inherent self-eonflict. forced out of its position as the knowledge aCthe immediate or
of what simply is.
Now Taylor claims that phenomenology can only do this if we first identifY cenain
pervasive and und~niable facets ofexperience which are outside any particular model of
~xperi~nceunder examination. For Taylor, dialectical movement, as explained earlier, is '"
relationship involving three terms. First, a certain model or notion of experience; second.
specific criteria! properties of knowing that furnish the standard that effective experience
must satisfY; and third. effective experience which is guided by this model ofexperience.
It is the second term which. for Taylor, accounts for the contradiction in ordinary
consciousness. But this would suggest that a phenomenological account of"sen..se<ertainty"
would not be an exposition in terms of the concept of knowing which animates "sense-
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certainty" as such· i.e. its claim to be immediate knowledge. Furthermore, the contradiction
within "sense<ertainty" would not be between its concept and its reality· i.e. what it is and
what is for it. but between effective experience guided by "sense.-eenainty" and cenain
presupposed undeniable facets of experience which condition the knowing subject, the .t'.
This characterization of knowing, however, is just what Hegel opposes in the
"Preface" and "Introduction" to the Phenomeno!ogy of Spirit although it is not limited to
that work. (n the PhilOSOphy QfMjnd, for example. Hegel writes:
The '(' is...being or has being as a moment within it. When I
sel this being as an Other over against me and al the same
time as identical with me, I am Knowing (Wissen) and have
the absolute certainty (Gewissheit) of my being. This cenainty
must not be regarded...as a kind of property of the ;1' as a
detennination in its nanue; on the contrary, it is to be grasped
as the very nature of the 't', for this cannot exist without
distinguishing itself from itself...~2
Knowing. then. is not simply some property ofme ego, the·r. However this is precisely
what transcendental arguments purport knowing to be. Thus. if"sense-ccrtainty" is simply
a model of experience, characterized by a knowing subject who has a certain vision of the
world. as Taylor conlends, it simply establishes thai we cannol effectively exercise our
subjectivhy except through the mediating instruments of universal concepts. And it merely
says something about our lives as subjects, whereas Hegelian phenomenology is an
exposilion or articulation of the essential dynamic of "sensc-certainty" ilSelf, its concept;
specifically. its necessary connection to ""perception", and by ex1ension its essential role in
Ih~ entire series of concepts thai constitutes the becoming oCknowledge or science.
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Therefore. to challenge "sense-eenainty" • to say what it means· would be to deal
with knowing as simply a property or determination afthe "', What phenomenology does.
however. is pay 8nention 10 how, in this relating to and distinguishing from something,
consciousness tests itself and discloses what in bUth it is. In the "Preface" to the
Phenomenology or Snirit Hegel observes:
The immediate existence of Spirit, consciousness, contains
the two moments ofknowing and the objectivity negative to
knowing. Since it is in this element [of consciousness) that
Spirit develops itself and explicates its moments. these
moments contain that antithesis. and they all appear as shapes
ofconsciousness.d
[t is only in this movement of becoming other to itself that spirit reveals its actuality and
truth.""' and educates itself to its own genuine foundations as an actual knowing spirit.
"Sense-certainty" is a moment in this process and is not merely some property of or
determination in the 01'. as Taylor suggests.
What. then. is the logic of"sense-certainty'""? It elaims to be immediate knowledge
of what simply is. a simple registering ofan immediate contenL In other words, it holds that
there is an immediate identity between a registering consciousness. the 'I', and a given
datum. the 'This'. "Scnse-eertainty" signifies the immediate identity of two particulars. the
"I'. and the "This' 0 In the dialectic of"sense<ertainty"', however, the 'I' and the 'This' reveal
themselves to be something other than this, namely. mediated and universaL Hegel remarks
at the beginning of the argument:
...pure being at once splits up into what we have called the
two 'Thises', one 'This' as .[', and the other 'This' as object.
tOO
When we reflect on this difference. we find that neither one
nor the other is only immediately present in sense-eertainty.
but each is at the same time mediated. I bave this certainty
through something else, viz. through the thing; and it.
similarly. is in sense-certainty through something else. viz.
through the 'I'.~'
··Sense-certainty". then. shows itself to be much more than the immediate identity between
itself and its object; that is to say. it is 001 simply the immediate apprehension of a pure
'This', Both the subject. as 'I'. and the object, as 'This' are mediated. each is what it is
through the mediation afthe other. Hegel quickly adds, nowever.lhat it is DatjUS! we, the
phenomenologists. wh.o make this distinction, but it is present within "sense-cenainty" i~lf.
"and it is to be taken up in the fonn in which it is present there..:'..l6
"Sense-certainty", then., finds itself falling into contradiction between what it judges
its objl:lct to be in itself and how it is present to it. In !he ensuing attempt to sustain the
oppositions that such a contradiction gives rise to, it will reinstate itself in II more
comprehensive form. In "sense-cenainty" this dialectical development has lhree phases. In
the first phase "sense-cenainty" takes the object as that wtUch is essential and urunediated.
and the'r as that which is unessential and mediated. Now. in this first phase, the question
{o be answered is whether the object, as that which is essential and unmediated, is what
"sense-cettainty" proclaims it to be. Hegel states:
The question must therefore be considered whether in sense·
cenainty itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that
sense· certainty proclaims it to be; whether this notion of it as
the essence corresponds to the way it is present in sense·
cenainty.~1
10\
His ensuing statement indicates how this question is to be answered.
To this end. we have 001 to reflect on it and ponder what it
might be in truth., but only to consider the way in which it is
present in sense'"Certainty.~·
We do not in other words. have to draw upon some underlying principle. 'to know is to be
able to say', in order 10 reveal what in tntth "sense-certainty" is. Because consciousness. for
Hegel. is inherently systematic. and so necessarily gives birth to an articulated series of
concepts. Thus. we do not need to invoke some 'underlying', 'original" or 'transcendental'
criterion in order to detennine what ·'sense-certair.ty" is.
Now. if we take the object as it presents itself in the first phase of "sense-certainty".
it does not correspond to what the object is proclaimed to be. something particular and
unmediated. The 'This' afthe object. if taken in its twofold shape as "now" and "here",
cannot be given a singular or particular designation. If we say the "now" is night, for
example. later "now" is not night, but noon; "'now" as noon is immediately supplanted by
"now" is not-noon, and so forth. "Now" is indifferently any state· day, night. noon, etc..
while preserving itself throughout. Indeed, what emerges at this point is the realization that
"now" is only permanent and self-preserving .....through the fact that something else, viz.
Day and Night. is nor".~~ That is to say, "now" is not something immediate but mediated.
But additionally, '"now", because it can be indifferently night, day, noon, etc., is in reality,
for Hegel. a universal. In the "now'" of "sense-eertainty", as well as the "here", the pwe
being of me object remains - i.e. it simply is, but no longer with the immediacy which it was
taken to have initially.ln the "'now'" and the "here" oC"sense-eenainty", thus, the object bas
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emerged as a pure universal. But it is jUSllhis new opposition which "sense-certainty" must
anempt to sustain which will insure the necessity aCthe advance.
Accordingly, the undoing of me object as immediate and particular signifies the
beginning of a new dialectical phase of ~sense-certainty". Because phenomenological
exposition cannot be imposed externally by us. where every dctenninate Conn of
consciousness must be forced out of itself by its own intemallogic, "sense-certainty" must
be given full reign and allowed 10 maintain its position. Hence. the immediacy of knowing
is now taken to lie in the 'I". in its 'seeing', 'hearing' and so on. As Hegel explains; "'Now'
is day because' see it; 'Here' is a tree for the same reason".w But "sense-certainty" now
experiences the same dialectic as it previously did when the essential element in its knowing
was the object. The -r, like the ;Now' and 'Here', is a universal. indifferent to what happens
10 it. Hegel observes:
I. lhis 'I'. see the tree and assert that 'Here" is a tree, but
another'(' sees the house and maintains that 'Here' is not a
tree but a house instead.Jl
Both are equally legitimate, but the one vanishes in the other. But in this movement of
experience what does not vanish is the 'I'. Hegel explains:
What does nol disappear in aJi this is the '1' as unh'f!rsol,
whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house,
but is a simple seeing which, though mediated by the negation
ofthis, etc., is all the same simple and indifferent to whatever
happens in it, to the house. the tree. etc..n
Again. what "sense-certainty" takes 10 be immediate knowledge turns out to be mediated.
The simple seeing ofthe 'I' is mediated bylbe Degation oftbe bouse, etc., and what remains
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through all its negations, is the pure universal 'f'.
"Sense..certainty". however. makes a final attempt to preserve its position and
declares thai it is the whole of "sense-certainty" itself which comprises immediate
knowledge. In other words. it is lhe immediacy oflhe whole subject/object framework itself
whiclt constitutes the essence of"sense-certainty", and not the immediacy of one or the other
of these elements. But this pure immediacy aCthe whole relation will prove unsatisfactory
In confining itself entirely to one immedia(e relation. for example. the I affirms or
indicates thaI -it is now day'. "sense-certainty" seeks to preserve knowledge of what simply
is. But the same dialectic operating on its previous incarnations again asserts itself. The
'Now' that is pointed to is never something that merely is, because in the very act of pointing
it out it ceases to be; that is 10 say. it is a 'Now' that has been. The 'Now' that is meant. when
pointed OUI. shows itself to be not an immediate knowing. but a knowing of what has been·
i.e. something which is superceded. The 'Now' that is meant, just as the .Here' which is
pointed to. shows itself not to be an immediate knowing. but a movement through a plurality
of'Nows' and 'Heres', What endures is a plurality of 'Nows' and 'Heres', which arise and
pass away, Hegel observes:
The pointing-out of the Now is thus itself the movement
which expresses what the Now is in truth. viz. a result. or a
plurality ofNows all taken together, and the pointing-out is
the experience of learning that Now is universal. JJ
Similarly:
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The Hen: that is meant would be the point; but it ;s not on the
contrary, when it is pointed out as something that is, the
pointing-out shows itselfto be not an immediate knowing [of
the point 1. but a movement from the Here that is meant
through many Heres into the universal Here which is a simple
pluralily of Heres. just as me day is a simple plurality of
Nows.J.l
··Sense-certainty". then, can no longer maintain itself to be thinking anything other than a
universal Here. lnstead of immediate knowledge ofwhat simply is, what emerges is sensible
universality in the form of"perception",
In the dialectic or"sense-certainty". then, the contradiction between what it takes to
be true for it. and thaI which actually is for it. is overcome in "perception". Thus the
singularity afthe object is negated in the dialectic of"sense-eertainty" and what emerges is
sensible universality. "Perception" comprehends the object as it takes it to be in itself. a
universal in general. Hegel's fannulation is as follows:
Perception. on the other hand, takes what is present to it as a
universal. Just as universality is its principle in general, lIle
immediately self-differentiating moments within perception
are universal: 'I' is a universal. and lIle object is a universal.s,
But the new object which emerges for "pen::eption", the thing with properties, will again
involve consciousness in contradiction. This time the contradiction is between the object as
an unconditioned universal and the object as a determinate singular. The entire argument of
"perception" is subsequently taken up wim the attempt on the part of "perception" to
preserve the truth ofthe object from this contradiction.
Now. for Taylor, the movement of"sense--cenainty" reflects our experience itself;
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that is. in our attempt to grasp panicuJar objects we discover that we can only get hold of
them through the mediating instruments of concepts. We cannot have knowledge of
particulars except as subsumed under universal concepts or descriptive tenns. But even
though the panicular can be given an infinite number ofdescriptions, its full meaning can
never be appreh~nded. Hence there is always a duality between the panicular thing and
descriptions found ltUe ofil. This., for Taylor, is the start afme next lranSCendentai argument.
This argument attempts to show that as subjects we cannot operate with property concepts
without anribuling them to particulars and redprocally that we cannot identify panicu[ars
without the use ofpropeny concepts. But in each case the transcendental argwnent is directed
towards defining me natwe and limits ofour experience or knowledge. and in this sense it
is grounded in the subject, the 'I'. and thus construes both "sense-certainty" and '"perCeption"
as simply subjective fonns ofexperience.
In other words. tor Taylor, knowledge is determined throughout, in its fonn. by the
a priori conditions imposed by the nature of human cognition. The fact that knowing. for us.
is inseparably bound up with being able to say, for example. precludes immediate knowledge
of particulars. We can only get hold of the particular through the mediating instruments of
universal concepts. That is to say. it is only through the mediating influence ofconcepts that
the 'given' of~sense-certainty"can be an object for us. It is impossible then, a priori. to
grasp sensible paniculars except as mediated through universal concepts. But it is also the
case that the universal concepts or descriptive terms in our experience only have meaning
through their union with sensible particulars. 10 either case, within "sense-cenainty",
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objeclivicy - i.e. what can be an object for us- is constituted by the prior rules laid down by
our own subjectivity. We could not have knowledge of sensible particulars without the
mediating influence of universal concepts, and we know this 10 be so because for us
knowledge is inseparably bound up with being able to say.
Hegel. on the other hand. grounds knowing in the series of phenomenal fonns of
itself. and not in the subject. the 'I'. Knowledge is nol grounded, as in uanscendental
argument, in some transcendental subject or a thinker behind thought. but in a series of
phenomenal fonns of itself. However, it is also necessary that science or knowing come to
know how the various phenomenal fomu ofordinary or finite consciousness are conslituent
of its standpoint. and. concomitantly, how it is their culmination. Phenomenology. then. is
just this exposition of its own development on the part of science. and in completing the
logic of the various roons of phenomenal knowing, educates itself as 10 its own genuine
principles and sheds its abstract character as a simply subjective standpoinl, with whal is only
"for it" Hegel wriles:
In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will
arrive at a point at which it gets rid ofits semblance of being
burdened with something alien, with what is only for il, and
some son of 'other', at a point where appearance becomes
identical with essence, so thai its exposition wHl coincide at
just this point with the authentic Science of Spirit. And
finally, when consciousness itselfgrasps this its own essence,
it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself.M
But transcendental arguments, by their very character, are grounded in the nature of
experience and only say something about the nature ofout lives as subjects. They can say~
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to bolTOW Taylor's example, that our experience is constituted by our sense ofourselves as
embodied subjects." Yet they can never preclude ultimate. ontological questions. Thus no
transition is ever effected from the realm of experience to what Hegel refers to above as
actual or absolute knowledge. Once one set of problems concerning the nature of our
experience and lhought is resolved, transcendental argwnent is always enmeshed in another
set of problems. Why? Because transcendental argument is a method of procedure which by
its very nature rests on a subject/object distinction· Le. it rests everything on consciousness
and its world. So Taylor concludes his article, "The Opening Arguments of the
Phenomenology", with the following comment
...once out oClhe bottle. the fly is not free; he is enmeshed in
another set of problems. harder if more rewarding to
explore,"
Transcenrlental arguments, thus. may establish something about our lives as subjects. but this
is all that they do; they never get around to what Hegel calls actual knowledge or speculative
philosophy.
III
By way ofconclusion I would like to reiterate that Taylor's reading of the opening
chapters of the Pbenomenglogy gfSpjrit is inappropriate given Hegel's criticism of Kantian
transcendental method. and also given his etTon 10 show how knowledge is nol simply a
function of the human subject. the ego. I have suggested that, for Hegel. subjective
consciousness musl forego its ideal ofviewing itself as an autonomous criterion that is !he
ultimate authority in all issues ofknowledge. To this end I have argued that, for Hegel. the
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real genesis of science is not me merely ronnal, apperceptive conditions of knowledge
through experience. but the entire series of the Cooos of finite or ordinary consciousness
which are constitutive aCknowledge as such. However. any appeal 10 conscious experience,
qua subjective. is only the starting point of an inquiry into knowledge, and not an end. In
other words. unlike transcendental argwnent, an inquiry into the reality aCknowledge is not
simply about establishing the nonns and limits wruch apply to knowing "for us", Knowledge
or science must also come to know how the various finite fonns ofordinary consciousness
are part of its own standpoint. and concomitantly how it is their outcome and truth. I have
argued. accordingly. that the various finite forms ofabsolute knowledge. embodied in "sense-
certainty", ·'perception". etc., represent the self-education of knowing to its own genuine
principles, and that it thereby sheds its abstract character as a merely subjective standpoint.
This is the idea which Hegel worked out in the Phenomenology ofSpjril.
Thus. insofar as the various forms of finite consciousness are constituenlS of this
process. they are not simply instances ofa subject who has a cenain vision of the world. to
which cenain norms and limits apply (l priori. Likewise. phenomenology, as lhe dialectical
exposition of this movement and outcome, is not a transcendentaJ argument That is to say,
it is not an attempt 10 infer back from what experience is like to what the structure of the
subject musl be if this experience is to be possible.
The "Preface" and "lntroduction"to the PbcnoWcoo'oRY ofSpjrit make it clear that
Hegel's goal is thai point where the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is
actually no distinction. In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness realizes that
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its distinction from a world. existing independent and opposed 10 it. is in fact no distinction.
At this point the elements of subjectivity and objectivity still exist. however they are not
polarities (isolated terms), but rather are ~essary moments within all knowledge. But lhis
absolute standpoint can never emerge if we presuppose an original subject/object division
between what things are and what they are '"for us". Unlike Taylor, then. I do not see Hegel
as trying to overcome dualism. in thai his position does not rest upon an original distinction
between our knowing and the world. The central distinction in the "Phenomenology" is
between finite consciousness, where the opposition between what is "for us" and what is "in
itself' remains. and absolute consciousness in which such an opposition is set aside.
Another way of understanding the difference between Hegelian phenomenology and
transcendental argument is in what each seeks to accomplish. What is sought in
transcendental argument is a principle ofobjectivity for self-conscious hwnan reason itself.
In Kant's work. to give an obvious example. transcendental argument is employed to
detennine how objectivity is constituted for the understanding within the context of the
given phenomena of immediate experience. What the world is actually like. however,
remains always problematical. Taylor. in construing "sense-certainty" as a transcendental
argument. is cartying on the same procedure. In "sense-eenainty", for example. the principle
ofobjectification is detennined to be the mediating instrwnent of universal concepts; lhat is
to say. particular objects can only be present to us through the mediating influence of
universal concepts. For both Kant and Taylor. though, knowledge is strictly a maner of
human consciousness imposing its own fonn on wbat it comes to know. Correspondingly.
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things are only what they are in the light of reflected reason, or as they are subjectively
constituted. But as such. objects, and the world generaJly, are without significance and
independent meaning. Subjectivity or reason, otherwise put, is not manifested in the actual
world. and the world. accordingly, is very much something which is alien and other to
consciousness.
Hegel. however, rejects any notion of an other which stands opposed and alien [0
consciousness. The stated goal ofconsciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that point
where it gets rid orits appearance of being burdened with something which is alien and other
to iI-SOl In other words. its ultimate goal is that point where the relationship ofconsciousness
and its world is overcome. that is. where reason is an w;:tive principle in the world. and not
simply subjective. And insofar as this is the uhimate goal aCthe Phenomenolggy O[Spjril,
science or philosophy depends upon this possibility as well. Hegel is quite clear on this
point:
Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this Aether as
such. is the ground and soil of Science or knowledge in
general. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires
that consciousness should dwell in this its elemenl.Ml
Thus. while Hegel recognizes. like all modem philosophy from Descanes on, that things
must be understood in the light oftbe principles ofsubjective reason • Le. what they an: for
thoUghL the above quote suggests that he also insists that this reason must discover itself in
'absolute otherness', in the world. Philosophical knowledge or science. in other words. is
not merely knowledge of reason as such, but as it is aetual.ly manifested in the world. To the
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extent that Hegel espouses this idea. the opening passages of the Phenomenology n(Spjril
arc not an essay in transcendental argumeDL
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